Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes

Yale Law Journal

Volumn 110, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 71-119

  Sunstein, Cass R ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0013315511     PISSN: 00440094     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/797587     Document Type: Review

References (231)

1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 426-27 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 358-59 (1971).
3. PATRICIA WALLACE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE INTERNET 81-82 (1999).
4. Sometimes it may seem that moral and political arguments are unlikely to have an effect on individual judgments; the evidence discussed here shows that arguments often induce considerable movement.
5. E.g., DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 128-64 (1996); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 287-328 (William Rehg trans., Polity Press 1996) (1992); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 133-45 (1993).
6. E.g., DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 128-64 (1996); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 287-328 (William Rehg trans., Polity Press 1996) (1992); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 133-45 (1993).
7. E.g., DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 128-64 (1996); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 287-328 (William Rehg trans., Polity Press 1996) (1992); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 133-45 (1993).
8. E.g., DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 128-64 (1996); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 287-328 (William Rehg trans., Polity Press 1996) (1992); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 133-45 (1993).
9. Exceptions include James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 44; and Susan C. Stokes, Pathologies of Deliberation, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 123. Of special interest are James Fishkin's continuing experiments with the "deliberative opinion poll," in which groups of diverse people are asked to deliberate on public issues. See James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin, Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue, in THE POLL WITH A HUMAN FACE 3 (Maxwell McCombs & Amy Reynolds eds., 1999). Fishkin's groups do not polarize, at least not systematically; this result is undoubtedly a product of the distinctive setting, in which materials are presented on each issue, with corresponding claims of fact and value. For a discussion of Fishkin, see infra text accompanying notes 193-203.
10. Exceptions include James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 44; and Susan C. Stokes, Pathologies of Deliberation, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 123. Of special interest are James Fishkin's continuing experiments with the "deliberative opinion poll," in which groups of diverse people are asked to deliberate on public issues. See James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin, Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue, in THE POLL WITH A HUMAN FACE 3 (Maxwell McCombs & Amy Reynolds eds., 1999). Fishkin's groups do not polarize, at least not systematically; this result is undoubtedly a product of the distinctive setting, in which materials are presented on each issue, with corresponding claims of fact and value. For a discussion of Fishkin, see infra text accompanying notes 193-203.
11. Exceptions include James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 44; and Susan C. Stokes, Pathologies of Deliberation, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 5, at 123. Of special interest are James Fishkin's continuing experiments with the "deliberative opinion poll," in which groups of diverse people are asked to deliberate on public issues. See James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin, Bringing Deliberation to the Democratic Dialogue, in THE POLL WITH A HUMAN FACE 3 (Maxwell McCombs & Amy Reynolds eds., 1999). Fishkin's groups do not polarize, at least not systematically; this result is undoubtedly a product of the distinctive setting, in which materials are presented on each issue, with corresponding claims of fact and value. For a discussion of Fishkin, see infra text accompanying notes 193-203.
12. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 108-09 (Ernest Barker trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1995).
13. Though the topic has been much studied within psychology, e.g., ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 200-48 (1986), I have been unable to find sustained discussions in the relevant literature in economics, sociology, philosophy, law, or political science, and there appears to be no treatment of the implications of group polarization for social behavior or the theory of democracy. Within the economics literature, an exception is Timothy Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game, 107 ECON. J. 1465 (1997), described by the authors as "the first study that attempts to incorporate this psychological literature into economics." Id. at 1466. For one of the rare treatments within sociology, see Noah E. Friedkin, Choice Shift and Group Polarization, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 856 (1999). Group polarization is also explored in Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five Years of Groups Research: What We Have Learned and What Needs To Be Addressed, 17 J. MGMT. 345, 356-59 (1991). There have been some valuable discussions of group polarization in the context of jury deliberations. A 1976 jury simulation study, BROWN, supra, at 226-29, tests for, and finds, group polarization, id. at 228; and a number of other mock jury studies, not intended to test for group polarization, collect evidence that it occurred in "every instance where the report of data makes it possible to check." Id. at 229; see also David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000).
14. Though the topic has been much studied within psychology, e.g., ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 200-48 (1986), I have been unable to find sustained discussions in the relevant literature in economics, sociology, philosophy, law, or political science, and there appears to be no treatment of the implications of group polarization for social behavior or the theory of democracy. Within the economics literature, an exception is Timothy Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game, 107 ECON. J. 1465 (1997), described by the authors as "the first study that attempts to incorporate this psychological literature into economics." Id. at 1466. For one of the rare treatments within sociology, see Noah E. Friedkin, Choice Shift and Group Polarization, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 856 (1999). Group polarization is also explored in Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five Years of Groups Research: What We Have Learned and What Needs To Be Addressed, 17 J. MGMT. 345, 356-59 (1991). There have been some valuable discussions of group polarization in the context of jury deliberations. A 1976 jury simulation study, BROWN, supra, at 226-29, tests for, and finds, group polarization, id. at 228; and a number of other mock jury studies, not intended to test for group polarization, collect evidence that it occurred in "every instance where the report of data makes it possible to check." Id. at 229; see also David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000).
15. Though the topic has been much studied within psychology, e.g., ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 200-48 (1986), I have been unable to find sustained discussions in the relevant literature in economics, sociology, philosophy, law, or political science, and there appears to be no treatment of the implications of group polarization for social behavior or the theory of democracy. Within the economics literature, an exception is Timothy Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game, 107 ECON. J. 1465 (1997), described by the authors as "the first study that attempts to incorporate this psychological literature into economics." Id. at 1466. For one of the rare treatments within sociology, see Noah E. Friedkin, Choice Shift and Group Polarization, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 856 (1999). Group polarization is also explored in Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five Years of Groups Research: What We Have Learned and What Needs To Be Addressed, 17 J. MGMT. 345, 356-59 (1991). There have been some valuable discussions of group polarization in the context of jury deliberations. A 1976 jury simulation study, BROWN, supra, at 226-29, tests for, and finds, group polarization, id. at 228; and a number of other mock jury studies, not intended to test for group polarization, collect evidence that it occurred in "every instance where the report of data makes it possible to check." Id. at 229; see also David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000).
16. Though the topic has been much studied within psychology, e.g., ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 200-48 (1986), I have been unable to find sustained discussions in the relevant literature in economics, sociology, philosophy, law, or political science, and there appears to be no treatment of the implications of group polarization for social behavior or the theory of democracy. Within the economics literature, an exception is Timothy Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game, 107 ECON. J. 1465 (1997), described by the authors as "the first study that attempts to incorporate this psychological literature into economics." Id. at 1466. For one of the rare treatments within sociology, see Noah E. Friedkin, Choice Shift and Group Polarization, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 856 (1999). Group polarization is also explored in Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five Years of Groups Research: What We Have Learned and What Needs To Be Addressed, 17 J. MGMT. 345, 356-59 (1991). There have been some valuable discussions of group polarization in the context of jury deliberations. A 1976 jury simulation study, BROWN, supra, at 226-29, tests for, and finds, group polarization, id. at 228; and a number of other mock jury studies, not intended to test for group polarization, collect evidence that it occurred in "every instance where the report of data makes it possible to check." Id. at 229; see also David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000).
17. Though the topic has been much studied within psychology, e.g., ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 200-48 (1986), I have been unable to find sustained discussions in the relevant literature in economics, sociology, philosophy, law, or political science, and there appears to be no treatment of the implications of group polarization for social behavior or the theory of democracy. Within the economics literature, an exception is Timothy Cason & Vai-Lam Mui, A Laboratory Study of Group Polarisation in the Team Dictator Game, 107 ECON. J. 1465 (1997), described by the authors as "the first study that attempts to incorporate this psychological literature into economics." Id. at 1466. For one of the rare treatments within sociology, see Noah E. Friedkin, Choice Shift and Group Polarization, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 856 (1999). Group polarization is also explored in Kenneth L. Bettenhausen, Five Years of Groups Research: What We Have Learned and What Needs To Be Addressed, 17 J. MGMT. 345, 356-59 (1991). There have been some valuable discussions of group polarization in the context of jury deliberations. A 1976 jury simulation study, BROWN, supra, at 226-29, tests for, and finds, group polarization, id. at 228; and a number of other mock jury studies, not intended to test for group polarization, collect evidence that it occurred in "every instance where the report of data makes it possible to check." Id. at 229; see also David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139 (2000).
18. The term is associated with Jürgen Habermas. HABERMAS, supra note 5, at 360-87; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Thomas Burger trans., Mass. Inst. of Tech. Press 1989) (1962).
19. The term is associated with Jürgen Habermas. HABERMAS, supra note 5, at 360-87; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Thomas Burger trans., Mass. Inst. of Tech. Press 1989) (1962).
20. Note that this statement has two different implications. First, a deliberating group, asked to make a group decision, will shift toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the median predeliberation judgment. Second, the tendency of individuals who compose a deliberating group, if polled anonymously after discussion, will be to shift toward a more extreme point in the direction indicated by the median predeliberation judgment. Frequently these two phenomena are collapsed in the empirical literature, and I will not always distinguish between them here. But for some purposes it is important to distinguish them, and hence some work refers to the movement of groups as "choice shifts" and the movement of individuals as "group polarization." E.g., Johannes A. Zuber et al., Choice Shift and Group Polarization: An Analysis of the Status of Arguments and Social Decision Schemes, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 50, 50, 59 (1992). I discuss this distinction in more detail below. Infra text accompanying notes 64-65. Note also that in the experimental work, both extremism and tendencies are measured not by reference to anything external, nor to a normative standard, but by reference to the particular scale that is brought before the individuals who compose the group. Thus, for example, people might be asked, on a scale of-5 to 5, how strongly they agree or disagree with a particular statement.
21. JOHN C. TURNER ET AL., REDISCOVERING THE SOCIAL GROUP 142 (1987).
22. Dominic Abrams et al., Knowing What To Think by Knowing Who You Are, 29 BRIT. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 97, 112 (1990).
23. I am speaking here of real-world deliberation, not of deliberation accompanied by preconditions of the sort that have been identified by those thinking of it in ideal terms. See, e.g., HABERMAS, supra note 5, at 99-131.
24. On the last point, see the discussion of African-American newspapers in RONALD JACOBS, RACE, MEDIA, AND THE CRISIS OF CIVIL SOCIETY: FROM WATTS TO RODNEY KING 140-51 (2000).
25. For the constitutional resonances, see infra notes 164-165, 169-171.
26. Caryn Christensen & Ann S. Abbott, Team Medical Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING IN HEALTH CARE 267, 273-76 (Gretchen Chapman & Frank Sonnenberg eds., 2000).
27. E.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997). For extended overviews, see ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL (7th ed. 1995); and LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION (1991). Group polarization is a surprising omission from both of these lengthy and highly illuminating treatments.
28. E.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997). For extended overviews, see ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL (7th ed. 1995); and LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION (1991). Group polarization is a surprising omission from both of these lengthy and highly illuminating treatments.
29. E.g., Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997). For extended overviews, see ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL (7th ed. 1995); and LEE Ross & RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION (1991). Group polarization is a surprising omission from both of these lengthy and highly illuminating treatments.
30. On the rationality of participation in a cascade, see David Hirschleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188, 189 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn lerulli eds., 1995).
31. For an entertaining and candid discussion, see the outline of attitudes of Microsoft employees, by a Microsoft employee, in Michael Kinsley, The View from the Cafeteria: Microsoft Employees Don't Recognize Themselves in the Government's Suit, TIME, Apr. 10, 2000, at 152, 2000 WL 17632849; the discussion can reasonably be taken to show both cascade effects and group polarization.
32. ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 17, at 28-57; Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (2000); Kahan, supra note 17.
33. Harold H. Gardner et al., Workers' Compensation and Family and Medical Leave Act Claim Contagion, 20 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 89, 101-10 (2000).
34. Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: Recycling the Concept of Norms To Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1017 (1990).
35. STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP'T OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT STATE TAX RESULTS 1, 5-6, 18-19 (1996), http://www.state.mn.us/ ebranch/mdor/reports/compliance/pdf.
36. Robert E. Kennedy, Strategy Fads and Competitive Convergence: An Empirical Test for Herd Behavior in Prime-Time Television Programming (Aug. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
37. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 767 (1999); H. Wesley Perkins, College Student Misperceptions of Alcohol and Other Drug Norms Among Peers: Exploring Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Prevention Programs 171, 194, in U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DESIGNING ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE (1997), available at http://www.edc.org/hec/pubs/theorybook/perkins.pdf. A good outline of contagion effects can be found in Gardner et al., supra note 21, at 91-93.
38. Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 767 (1999); H. Wesley Perkins, College Student Misperceptions of Alcohol and Other Drug Norms Among Peers: Exploring Causes, Consequences, and Implications for Prevention Programs 171, 194, in U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DESIGNING ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN HIGHER EDUCATION: BRINGING THEORY INTO PRACTICE (1997), available at http://www.edc.org/hec/pubs/theorybook/perkins.pdf. A good outline of contagion effects can be found in Gardner et al., supra note 21, at 91-93.
39. E.g., ARONSON, supra note 17, at 22; ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 17, at 44-45.
40. Andrew Caplin & John Leahy, Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and Search, 108 ECON. J. 60, 61 (1998).
41. GEORGE A. AKERLOF, A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemployment May Be One Consequence, in AN ECONOMIC THEORIST'S BOOK OF TALES 69 (1984).
42. See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 8-10, 122-45 (1999) (connecting luxury purchases to competition for better relative position). This is only part of Frank's account; he also emphasizes the "frame of reference" created by most people's decisions. Id. at 131-32.
43. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 691-703, 715-35 (discussing the relationship between certain cascades and democratic politics). See generally TIMUR KURAN, PRIVATE TRUTH, PUBLIC LIES 3-21 (1995) (discussing preference falsification because of public pressures).
44. For an overview, see Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 13 (Elliot Aronson ed., 1995).
45. Id. at 15.
46. Id. at 16.
47. Id. at 18.
48. Abrams et al., supra note 12, at 106-08. See also the discussion of the "downside" of social ties among group members in Brooke Harrington, Cohesion, Conflict and Group Demography (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal), which shows that when social ties are in place, dissent may be suppressed and decisions may be worse as a result.
49. Abrams et al., supra note 12, at 106-08.
50. The least conformity, and the greatest accuracy, were found when people who thought of themselves as being in a different group were speaking publicly. At the same time, the largest number of conforming, inaccurate responses came when people thought of themselves as being in the same group and were speaking publicly - even though the number of inaccurate private responses in that experimental condition was not notably higher than in other conditions. Id. at 108.
51. Asch, supra note 31, at 17.
52. ARONSON, supra note 17, at 23-24.
53. Abrams et al., supra note 12, at 108. By contrast, people who thought that they were members of a different group actually gave more accurate, nonconforming answers when speaking publicly, which creates an interesting puzzle: Why was there more accuracy in public than in private statements? The puzzle is solved by considering the likelihood that subjects could consider it an affirmative good to disagree with people from another group (even if they secretly suspected that those people might be right). In the real world, this effect may well be heightened when people are asked whether they agree with opponents or antagonists; they might well say "no" even when the answer is "yes," simply because agreement carries costs, either to reputation or to self-conception.
54. Asch, supra note 31, at 21.
55. E.g., Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 847 (1997); Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797 (1992); Sushil Biikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998): Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 158, 159-65 (1999).
56. E.g., Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 847 (1997); Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797 (1992); Sushil Biikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998): Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 158, 159-65 (1999).
57. E.g., Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 847 (1997); Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797 (1992); Sushil Biikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998): Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 158, 159-65 (1999).
58. E.g., Lisa R. Anderson & Charles A. Holt, Information Cascades in the Laboratory, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 847 (1997); Abhijit V. Banerjee, A Simple Model of Herd Behavior, 107 Q.J. ECON. 797 (1992); Sushil Biikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998): Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Stampede to Judgment: Persuasive Influence and Herding Behavior by Courts, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 158, 159-65 (1999).
59. See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 763-67.
60. Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC. 1420, 1441-42 (1978). For a recent popular treatment, see MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 5-22 (2000).
61. Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective Behavior, 83 AM. J. SOC. 1420, 1441- 42 (1978). For a recent popular treatment, see MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 5-22 (2000).
62. See generally Anderson & Holt, supra note 42.
63. See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 715-35.
64. ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 151-67 (2000).
65. Kennedy, supra note 24.
66. Several of these examples are discussed in Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 725-35; and Granovetter, supra note 44, at 1422-24. With respect to AIDS, unfortunate and literally deadly cascade effects can be found in South Africa. President Mbeke's widely publicized doubts about a connection between AIDS and HIV came from learning about the views of " denialists" as a result of surfing the Internet. Thomas H. Maugh II, AIDS Researchers Meet at Ground Zero, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2000, at A1, 2000 WL 2258962. In addition, many myths have spread, suggesting, for example, that there is a "miracle cure" and that organic food is a shield or a cure. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., South Africa: Aw C'mon, You Don't Really Believe Those AIDS Myths, AFRICA NEWS, June 11, 1999, 1999 WL 19530508.
67. Several of these examples are discussed in Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 725-35; and Granovetter, supra note 44, at 1422-24. With respect to AIDS, unfortunate and literally deadly cascade effects can be found in South Africa. President Mbeke's widely publicized doubts about a connection between AIDS and HIV came from learning about the views of " denialists" as a result of surfing the Internet. Thomas H. Maugh II, AIDS Researchers Meet at Ground Zero, L.A. TIMES, July 10, 2000, at A1, 2000 WL 2258962. In addition, many myths have spread, suggesting, for example, that there is a "miracle cure" and that organic food is a shield or a cure. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., South Africa: Aw C'mon, You Don't Really Believe Those AIDS Myths, AFRICA NEWS, June 11, 1999, 1999 WL 19530508.
68. See Daughety & Reinganum, supra note 42, at 167-82 (discussing the possibility of herd behavior by courts).
69. This point has an echo in findings on group polarization, as those with entrenched views are less likely to "move" as a result of discussion. See infra text accompanying notes 98-99.
70. KURAN, supra note 30, at 4-21.
71. See Susanne Lohmann, The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91, 47 WORLD POL. 42, 76 (1994).
72. I do not deal here with the general and related question whether groups amplify or eliminate various cognitive and motivational biases in individual decisions. For a general overview, finding mixed results, see Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 687 (1996).
73. Daniel J. Isenberg, Group Polarisation: A Critical Review and Meta-Analysis, 50 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1141, 1141 (1986).
74. When different deliberating groups polarize in different directions, the consequence can be greater variance among groups, notwithstanding small initial differences. A group whose members are initially but tentatively disposed to reject some proposal might start out very close to a group whose members are initially but tentatively disposed to approve of that proposal. If the two groups have a number of intragroup discussions, but no intergroup discussions, they may end up very far apart.
75. BROWN, supra note 8, at 222-26. These include the United States, England, and France. See also, e.g., Abrams et al., supra note 12, at 112 (New Zealand); Zuber et al., supra note 10 (Germany). Of course, it is possible that some cultures would show a greater or lesser tendency toward polarization; this would be an extremely interesting area for empirical study.
76. BROWN, supra note 8, at 224.
77. David G. Myers, Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 HUM. REL. 699, 710-12 (1975).
78. BROWN, supra note 8, at 224 (discussing a study in David G. Myers & George D. Bishop, The Enhancement of Dominant Attitudes in Group Discussion, 20 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 386 (1971)).
79. Id.
80. In laboratory studies, polarization occurs in terms of a specified issue and a specified scale. Thus any tendency toward extremism is scale-relative; it need not mean extremism as a normative matter, or across a full population. In the real world, political entrepreneurs, with self-interested or altruistic agendas, are in some sense aware of the importance of the scale at issue, and attempt to produce shifts along the scale that has been self-consciously made salient. The salient scales ("Do you approve of quotas?" as opposed to "Do you believe in remedial steps for traditionally disadvantaged groups?") can be extremely important.
81. BROWN, supra note 8, at 248 (citing J.A.F. Stoner, A Comparison of Individual and Group Decisions Including Risk (1961) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Library)); James A.F. Stoner, Risky and Cautious Shifts in Group Decisions, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 442 (1968). In this and the following paragraph, I draw from BROWN, supra note 8, at 200-06.
82. BROWN, supra note 8, at 248 (citing J.A.F. Stoner, A Comparison of Individual and Group Decisions Including Risk (1961) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Library)); James A.F. Stoner, Risky and Cautious Shifts in Group Decisions, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 442 (1968). In this and the following paragraph, I draw from BROWN, supra note 8, at 200-06.
83. For an insistence on this distinction, see Zuber et al., supra note 10, at 50, 59.
84. Id. at 59 ("[I]t is necessary to differentiate between choice shift and group polarization . . . . [T]he ongoing processes at these two levels may differ.").
85. See BROWN, supra note 8, at 208-10, for an overview.
86. Paul F. Cromwell et al., Group Effects on Decision-Making by Burglars, 69 PSYCHOL. REP. 579, 586 (1991).
87. BROWN, supra note 8, at 211.
88. Id. at 224, 226-27.
89. A relatively recent treatment is Russell Spears et al., De-Individuation and Group Polarization in Computer-Mediated Communication, 29 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 121 (1990).
90. TURNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 153.
91. BROWN, supra note 8, at 207-08. Note, however, that one account of group polarization finds that the effect lies in conformity to the "prototypical group member," defined as such by reference to a "meta-contrast principle: the less a person differs from in-group members and the more he or she differs from out-group members, the more representative is he or she of the ingroup." Craig McGarty et al., Group Polarization as Conformity to the Prototypical Group Member, 31 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 3 (1992). This position raises many questions; it seems to have the strongest fit with the data in cases in which in-groups and out-groups can readily be understood as such by subjects. See id.
92. BROWN, supra note 8, at 210-29, and Isenberg, supra note 55, review this literature; see also TURNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 142-70, for an overview and an attempt to generate a new synthesis.
93. For a quite vivid demonstration of a related process in the enactment of the Clean Air Act-one that does not, however, identify the mechanisms discussed here - see E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985).
94. Brown notes: Once the real location of the mean was known, should it not be the case, granting that everyone wanted to see himself as reasonably audacious, that those who were really below the mean would be motivated to adopt riskier positions and so change the mean and produce the risky shift? BROWN, supra note 8, at 214.
95. Allan I. Teger & Dean G. Pruitt, Components of Group Risk Taking, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 189 (1967).
96. One might point here to both one-upsmanship and the removal of pluralistic ignorance, that is, ignorance of what other people think (or are willing to say they think). It is implicit in these findings that people seem to want not to conform, but to be different from others in a desirable way. While highly suggestive, however, the "mere exposure" finding does not confirm the social influence account; it is possible that the views of others simply provide an informational signal, quite apart from arguments, and hence that people move not in order to maintain reputation, but to do what is right.
97. The phenomenon of group polarization may seem to raise doubts about rational actor models in economics or law. (On those models generally, see GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).) But individual behavior within groups, as described thus far, should create no such doubts. It is certainly rational to make assessments on the basis of arguments offered; if the most numerous and convincing arguments seem to justify a shift, individual shifts are entirely rational. More difficult questions might seem to be raised by "social influence" accounts of group polarization. But it is also rational for people to care about their reputations. If they change their assessment because of reputational considerations, then maintaining a certain reputation is simply part of what people care about (and there is nothing irrational about that). If people shift not for reputational reasons but because of a certain self-conception - if, for example, they think of themselves as people who are bold, or committed to a strong national defense, or left of center on issues of race - a change in position, after exposure to the views of others, also seems entirely rational.
98. The phenomenon of group polarization may seem to raise doubts about rational actor models in economics or law. (On those models generally, see GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES (1996); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).) But individual behavior within groups, as described thus far, should create no such doubts. It is certainly rational to make assessments on the basis of arguments offered; if the most numerous and convincing arguments seem to justify a shift, individual shifts are entirely rational. More difficult questions might seem to be raised by "social influence" accounts of group polarization. But it is also rational for people to care about their reputations. If they change their assessment because of reputational considerations, then maintaining a certain reputation is simply part of what people care about (and there is nothing irrational about that). If people shift not for reputational reasons but because of a certain self-conception - if, for example, they think of themselves as people who are bold, or committed to a strong national defense, or left of center on issues of race - a change in position, after exposure to the views of others, also seems entirely rational.
99. BROWN, supra note 8, at 219-20. An experimental study (on willingness to sacrifice money for the sake of fairness) has found support for the social influence explanation but not for the persuasive arguments explanation. Cason & Mui, supra note 8, at 1476-78.
100. See, e.g., Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 78, at 61, 71-76 (discussing, inter alia, findings that the same option is evaluated more favorably when it is seen as the intermediate choice within a range of options).
101. A related possibility is that hearing other similar opinions produces greater confidence in individual positions, opening members to more extreme judgments in the same direction. This possibility has been raised by Heath and Gonzalez, Chip Heath & Rich Gonzalez, Interaction with Others Increases Decision Confidence but Not Decision Quality: Evidence Against Information Collection Views of Interactive Decision Making, 61 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 305, 318-19 (1995).
102. This is of course the plot of the movie Twelve Angry Men, in which the single holdout, played by Henry Fonda, shifts the judgment of the jury. See TWELVE ANGRY MEN (United Artists 1957); see also BROWN, supra note 8, at 229-39 (discussing the movie's psychological realism).
103. Brooke Harrington, The Pervasive Effects of Embeddedness in Organizations 23-24 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Yale Law Journal).
104. Hermann Brandstätter, Social Emotions in Discussion Groups, in DYNAMICS OF GROUP DECISIONS 93, 93-97, 106-08 (Hermann Brandstätter et al. eds., 1978). In TURNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 154-59, the authors attempt to use this evidence as a basis for a new synthesis, one that they call "a self-categorization theory of group polarization." Id. at 154. In this account, "persuasion is dependent upon self-categorizations which create a common identity within a group" and polarization occurs "because group members adjust their opinion in line with their image of the group position (conform) and more extreme, already polarized, prototypical responses determine this image." Id. at 156. When a group is leaning in a certain direction, the perceived "prototype" is determined by where the group is leaning, and this is where individuals will shift. Id. For possible differences in predictions, and supporting evidence, see id. at 158-70. An especially interesting implication, perhaps in some tension with the persuasive arguments theory, is that a group of comparative extremists will show a comparatively greater shift toward extremism. Id. at 158.
105. Id. at 151.
106. Harrington, supra note 35, at 26.
107. Maryla Zaleska, The Stability of Extreme and Moderate Responses in Different Situations, in GROUP DECISION MAKING 163, 164 (Hermann Brandstätter et al. eds., 1982).
108. WALLACE, supra note 3, at 73-76; Abrams et al., supra note 12, at 113-16; Spears et al., supra note 70, at 130-31.
109. Spears et al., supra note 70, at 122-24.
110. Harrington, supra note 83, at 26.
111. See the illuminating remarks on herd behavior, repression, and social identity in AMARTYA SEN, REASON BEFORE IDENTITY 19-22 (1999).
112. TURNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 159-62; Abrams et al., supra note 12, at 98-99; Spears et al., supra note 70, at 123-24, 130-31.
113. Eugene Burnstein, Persuasion as Argument Processing, in GROUP DECISION MAKING, supra note 87, at 103, 107-11.
114. Duncan A. Ferguson & Neil Vidmar, Effects of Group Discussion on Estimates of Culturally Appropriate Risk Levels, 20 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 436, 443-44 (1971).
115. BROWN, supra note 8, at 225.
116. Amiram Vinokur & Eugene Burnstein, Effects of Partially Shared Persuasive Arguments on Group-Induced Shifts: A Group-Problem-Solving Approach, 29 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 305, 314 (1974).
117. Burnstein, supra note 93, at 111-12.
118. BROWN, supra note 8, at 226.
119. See Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 6, at 29-30.
120. This is an oversimplication. What really matters is the predeliberation mean; the more extreme means will produce more extreme shifts, and a more extreme mean can exist within a heterogeneous group (say, a mean of +3, on a scale of -5 to +5, with a range of views) than in a group of like-minded people (say, a mean of +1, on the same scale, because every member is at + 1).
121. Schkade et al., supra note 8. There is also a question about the effects, in experiments or in the real world over time, of small differences in initial views. Is it really the case, for example, that a group with five people opposed to affirmative action, and six in favor, will end up in a very different place from a group with six people opposed, and five in favor? Probably the best answer is that because the initial median is so close in the two cases, significant shifts over time are unlikely in experimental settings and probably in the real world.
122. Id. at 1156.
123. Id. at 1140.
124. For a relevant discussion of deliberating groups in the 1960s, see JAMES MILLER, "DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS": FROM PORT HURON TO THE SIEGE OF CHICAGO (1994) , which traces increased radicalism and the spread of radical ideas; compare this with the discussion of "ethnification" in Eastern Europe in Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STOD. 623, 648-49 (1998). See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text .
125. For a relevant discussion of deliberating groups in the 1960s, see JAMES MILLER, "DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS": FROM PORT HURON TO THE SIEGE OF CHICAGO (1994) , which traces increased radicalism and the spread of radical ideas; compare this with the discussion of "ethnification" in Eastern Europe in Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STOD. 623, 648-49 (1998). See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text .
126. See TURNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 152 (suggesting that there is no clear answer to the question, "For what range of situations is polarization predicted?").
127. See the discussion of legislators infra Subsection IV.E.4. Note, as inevitably noisy real-world examples, the centrist shift of the Democratic Party from 1980 to 1992 and the apparent centrist shift of the Republican Party from 1995 to 2000.
128. Hirschleifer, supra note 18, at 198-200 (discussing effects of public releases of information).
129. Schkade et al., supra note 8.
130. Id. at 1161-62.
131. Id.
132. Data from the study of punitive damages awards strongly support this speculation, with many deliberating juries producing dollar awards higher - and sometimes significantly higher-than the highest individual dollar award prior to deliberation. See id. at 1155-56. See also Cason & Mui, supra note 8, at 1476-78, which finds that, regardless of the initial distribution of views, groups systematically shift in the direction of greater willingness to sacrifice their material self-interest for the sake of fairness. Cason and Mui study choice shifts in the distinctive setting of the Dictator Game, in which a proposer is asked to divide a certain sum of money between herself and another subject, who must accept any allocation that the proposer selects. They find that for groups generally, the consequence of group discussion is to shift the proposed allocation in the direction of equality.
133. David G. Myers, Polarizing Effects of Social Interaction, in GROUP DECISION MAKING, supra note 87, at 125, 135.
134. Compare the discussion of availability entrepreneurs in Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 25, at 733, and of norm entrepreneurs in Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 909 (1996); these terms emphasize different kinds of signaling by political leaders, whether self-interested or altruistic. The polarization entrepreneur, like the availability entrepreneur, shows an awareness of certain aspects of human psychology that are easily exploited to produce movement in preferred directions.
135. See LOIS MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL: THE STORY CONTINUES . . . (1998).
136. Id. at 28-110.
137. See PENINA GLAZER & MYRON GLAZER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRUSADERS 6-15, 50-57, 171-73 (1998).
138. TURNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 154.
139. I owe the example to Wiktor Osiatynski.
140. Cf. ARONSON, supra note 17, at 242-43 (discussing the mass suicide at Jonestown).
141. TURNER ET AL., supra note 11, at 158, 167-70.
142. Heath & Gonzalez, supra note 81, at 323-24.
143. Id. at 322.
144. E.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961) ("Concerted action . . . decreases the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of criminality."). I am grateful to Dan Kahan for pressing this point. Recall that while actual burglars show a cautious shift in general conversation, their practices show a shift toward greater risk-taking (and correspondingly greater dangers for ordinary citizens). Cromwell et al., supra note 67.
145. See the treatment in JACOBS, supra note 14, at 140-51.
146. Kuran, supra note 104, at 648.
147. See id. at 650-51.
148. E.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION 124-32 (1999).
149. Id. at 124-28.
150. JACOBS, supra note 14, at 144-45.
151. Id.
152. A detailed discussion can be found in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (draft of June 25, 2000) (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript on file with The Yale Law Journal).
153. WALLACE, supra note 3, at 78.
154. Kuran, supra note 104, at 635-51.
155. Compare the demonstration of serious errors within online working groups in Ross Hightower & Luftus Sayeed, The Impact of Computer-Mediated Communication Systems on Biased Group Discussion, 11 COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 33 (1995).
156. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
157. Id. at 661.
158. Thomas W. Hazlett & David W. Sosa, Was the Fairness Doctrine a "Chilling Effect"? Evidence from the Postderegulation Radio Market, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1997) (offering an affirmative answer to the question in the title).
159. HABERMAS, supra note 5, at 362.
160. Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 499, 549-57 (2000).
161. SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 205-07; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 131 (manuscript at 102-14) (discussing Shapiro's proposal and other reforms designed to promote exposure to diverse ideas).
162. The term comes from Nicholas Negroponte. See SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 45.
163. BROWN, supra note 8, at 227-29 (collecting studies).
164. Id. at 229. See Schkade et al., supra note 8, for a treatment of choice shifts on juries deliberating about punitive damages.
165. 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(5) (1994) (FCC); 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1994) (FTC).
166. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1755 (1997).
167. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1755 (1997).
168. Revesz, supra note 145, at 1755.
169. See Cross & Tiller, supra note 145.
170. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
171. Cross & Tiller, supra note 145, at 2172.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See the empirical references in Christensen & Abbott, supra note 16, at 273-77.
175. See the discussion of the shift, over time, from the "unthinkable" to the "unthought" in KURAN, supra note 30, at 176-95.
176. See the discussion of African-American newspapers in JACOBS, supra note 14, at 31-53.
177. Infra text accompanying notes 163-172.
178. E.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 205-07; SUNSTEIN, supra note 131 (manuscript at 102-03, 111-14).
179. For various perspectives, see DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra note 5.
180. See the discussion of imperfect procedural justice and pure procedural justice in RAWLS, supra note 2, at 83-90.
181. E.g., 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 99 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984) (1981). Thus Habermas distinguishes between strategic and communicative action and stresses "the cooperatively pursued goal of reaching understanding." Id. Compare Habermas's view with the treatment in GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 52-94, referring to the idea of reciprocity, which emphasizes the desire to justify one's position by reference to reasons.
182. See Robert E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 75, 77-90 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986) (discussing self-censorship as a check on invidious views).
183. The role of deliberation is not eliminated. There remains the question of what to do, given a certain understanding of the facts.
184. Supra note 123 and accompanying text.
185. Federalist No. 51 can well be read in this light. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
186. See the recent proposals in Minnesota, outlined and discussed in George Will, Editorial, One-House Town, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 1999, at A35, 1999 WL 23312778.
187. JAMES WILSON. Lectures on Law, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 291 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).
188. Harrington, supra note 83, at 25-26.
189. Infra text accompanying notes 173-177.
190. See Harrington, supra note 83, for supporting evidence in the context of concrete group tasks (involving investment clubs).
191. Charlan Jeanne Nemeth, Differential Contributions of Majority and Minority Influence, 93 PSYCHOL. REV. 23 (1986); Harrington, supra note 83.
192. SUNSTEIN, supra note 5, at 22.
193. Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 41-42 (1985).
194. RAWLS, supra note 2, at 359.
195. See, for example, the discussion of consciousness raising in CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83-105 (1989).
196. A controversial and highly publicized case in point is the effort by the
197. See Christensen & Abbott, supra note 16, at 273.
198. Id. at 274.
199. Catherine Kirchmeyer & Aaron Cohen, Multicultural Groups: Their Performance and Reactions with Constructive Conflict, 17 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 153, 166 (1992). Interestingly, there is evidence that with changes in gender norms, some tasks show no gender differences in influence on groups. See Katherine W. Hawkins, Effects of Gender and Communication Content on Leadership Emergence in Small Task-Oriented Groups, 26 SMALL GROUP RES. 234, 243-44 (1995).
200. Catherine Kirchmeyer & Aaron Cohen, Multicultural Groups: Their Performance and Reactions with Constructive Conflict, 17 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 153, 166 (1992). Interestingly, there is evidence that with changes in gender norms, some tasks show no gender differences in influence on groups. See Katherine W. Hawkins, Effects of Gender and Communication Content on Leadership Emergence in Small Task-Oriented Groups, 26 SMALL GROUP RES. 234, 243-44 (1995).
201. See, e.g., ARONSON, supra note 17, at 242-43 (discussing the role of cult leaders); LEON FESTINGER ET AL., WHEN PROPHECY FAILS 3-30 (1956) (discussing conditions for continued commitment to implausible beliefs, including the need for social support).
202. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Jan. 30, 1787), in THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 416-17 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1975).
203. Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors (Nov. 3, 1774), in BURKE'S POLITICS: SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF EDMUND BURKE ON REFORM, REVOLUTION, AND WAR 116 (Ross J.S. Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1949).
204. Id.
205. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 84 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
206. See Sunstein, supra note 171, at 41-42.
207. This is a possible reading of ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 39, 43, 53-57 (1986), which asserts the need for destabilization rights.
208. See IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS 267-71 (2d ed. 1982).
209. See HABERMAS, supra note 9, at 231-50.
210. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 131 (manuscript at 102-03, 111-14).
211. See supra Subsection IV.E.3.
212. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 183-91 (1990) (urging group representation as a means of ensuring expression of plural perspectives); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1585-89 (1988) (urging group representation as a means of ensuring good deliberation about the public good). For an overview of the debate, see also the essays in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984).
213. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 183-91 (1990) (urging group representation as a means of ensuring expression of plural perspectives); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1585-89 (1988) (urging group representation as a means of ensuring good deliberation about the public good). For an overview of the debate, see also the essays in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984).
214. See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 183-91 (1990) (urging group representation as a means of ensuring expression of plural perspectives); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1585-89 (1988) (urging group representation as a means of ensuring good deliberation about the public good). For an overview of the debate, see also the essays in CHOOSING AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM: ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVES (Arend Lijphart & Bernard Grofman eds., 1984).
215. Charles G. Lord et al., Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2102-04 (1979).
216. Id.
217. See Brian Mullen et al., Group Cohesiveness and Quality of Decision Making, 25 SMALL GROUP RES. 189, 199-202 (1994); Brian Mullen & Carolyn Copper, The Relation Between Group Cohesiveness and Performance: An Integration, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 210, 225 (1994). For evidence to this effect, see Harrington, supra note 35, at 30-34.
218. See Brian Mullen et al., Group Cohesiveness and Quality of Decision Making, 25 SMALL GROUP RES. 189, 199-202 (1994); Brian Mullen & Carolyn Copper, The Relation Between Group Cohesiveness and Performance: An Integration, 115 PSYCHOL. BULL. 210, 225 (1994). For evidence to this effect, see Harrington, supra note 35, at 30-34.
219. JAMES S. FISHKIN, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE 43, 161-81 (1997).
220. Id. at 206-07.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 207.
223. Fishkin & Luskin, supra note 6, at 23.
224. See id. at 22-23 (showing a jump, on a scale of 1 to 4, from 3.51 to 3.58 in intensity of commitment to reducing the deficit; showing a jump, on a scale of 1 to 3, from 2.71 to 2.85 in intensity of support for greater spending on education; and showing a jump, on a scale of 1 to 3, from 1.95 to 2.16, in commitment to aiding American business interests abroad).
225. Id. at 23; see also id. at 22 (showing an increase, on a scale of 1 to 3, from 1.40 to 1.59 in commitment to spending on foreign aid; also showing a decrease, on a scale of 1 to 3, from 2.38 to 2.27 in commitment to spending on Social Security).
226. See Teger & Pruitt, supra note 76, at 201-02 (finding group polarization on mere exposure to the views of others).
227. Id. at 196-201.
228. Note, however, that choice shifts were produced in the context of jury deliberations, also involving heterogeneous groups. Schkade et al., supra note 8, at 1154-56.
229. Hence there is reason for caution about the proposal for "deliberation day" offered by Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin. BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (forthcoming). The problem lies in the highly territorial nature of the proposal, in which people would deliberate with those in their community. This is a recipe for group polarization and social fragmentation.
230. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 186 (2000); SHAPIRO, supra note 127, at 105-23.
231. The case of like-minded deliberators is the simplest one, but note that as long as there is a defined median, group polarization can occur in heterogeneous groups as well.