Ternary voting games

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 335-351

  Felsenthal, Dan S ^a   Machover, Moshé ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA   (Israel)

^b KING'S COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031496650     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF01263275     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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