Chapter 13 Empirical Studies of Corporate Law

Handbook of Law and Economics

Volumn 2, Issue , 2007, Pages 945-1012

  Bhagat, Sanjai ^a   Romano, Roberta ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

corporate governance; Corporate law; corporate litigation; event study

Indexed keywords

EID: 41349094415     PISSN: 15740730     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0730(07)02013-0     Document Type: Review

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