Does Confidential Proxy Voting Matter?

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 32, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 465-509

  Romano, Roberta ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242656106     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/377048     Document Type: Review

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