DOS Kapital: Has antitrust action against Microsoft created value in the computer industry?

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 55, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 329-359

  Bittlingmayer, George ^a   Hazlett, Thomas W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust; Computer industry; Financial effects of regulation; G1; K2; L1; L4; L5; Microsoft; Monopoly

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034147271     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00053-7     Document Type: Article

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