Asymmetry in information versus asymmetry in power: Implicit assumptions of agency theory?

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 36, Issue 6, 2007, Pages 825-840

  Saam, Nicole J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ERFURT   (Germany)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Identification systems; Social power

Indexed keywords

EID: 35748950993     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.socec.2007.01.018     Document Type: Article

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