Crossing the organizational void: The limits of agency theory in the analysis of regulatory control

Governance

Volumn 9, Issue 4, 1996, Pages 407-428

  Eisner, Marc Allen ^a   Worsham, Jeff ^a   Ringquist, Evan ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0030460068     PISSN: 09521895     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0491.1996.tb00250.x     Document Type: Article

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