Nonmajoritarian institutions and the limits of democratic governance: A political transaction-cost approach

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics

Volumn 157, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 57-78

  Majone, Giandomenico ^a  

^a NONE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035608998     PISSN: 09324569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1628/0932456012974747     Document Type: Article

References (38)

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