Comparing varieties of agency theory in economics, political science, and sociology: An illustration from state policy implementation

Sociological Theory

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 146-170

  Kiser, Edgar ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033239650     PISSN: 07352751     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0735-2751.00073     Document Type: Article

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