Crisis as shirking: An agency theory explanation of the souring of American civil-military relations

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 407-434

  Feaver, Peter D ^a  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

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EID: 0032220519     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X9802400305     Document Type: Article

References (61)

1. 1. By crisis I refer to the civil-military problems outlined, among other places, in Richard Kohn, "Out of Control," National Interest (Spring 1994): 3-17; and Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," The Journal of Military History 57, 5 (October 1993): 27-58.
2. 1. By crisis I refer to the civil-military problems outlined, among other places, in Richard Kohn, "Out of Control," National Interest (Spring 1994): 3-17; and Russell F. Weigley, "The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from McClellan to Powell," The Journal of Military History 57, 5 (October 1993): 27-58.
3. 2. Certainly, it would be possible to give a richer description of the crisis than the one given by my model. But describing a particular civil-military situation is different from accounting for that situation in terms of a more generalizable model of civil-military relations - the latter is a more profitable exercise for the purposes of theory building.
4. 3. The model is explained more fully in Peter D. Feaver, Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (in preparation). The argument also builds on an earlier decision-theoretic version of the agency model developed in Peter D. Feaver, "Delegation, Monitoring, and Civilian Control of the Military: Agency Theory and American Civil-Military Relations," Olin Institute Working Paper No. 4, May 1996.
5. 4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 155-156, and 345-346. See also Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," in Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington, Civil-Military Relations (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), 5-28.
6. 4. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 155-156, and 345-346. See also Samuel P. Huntington, "The Soldier and the State in the 1970s," in Andrew J. Goodpaster and Samuel P. Huntington, Civil-Military Relations (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1977), 5-28.
7. 5. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, 1971), 435.
8. 6. The game makes several simplifying assumptions. I assume that the actors adhere to some minimal standard of instrumental rationality and that both the civilian and the military conceive of themselves as principals and agents. I also assume as a point of departure that the civilian and military actors can be represented as only two players. In fact, I recognize that there are multiple principals (the president, Congress, the secretary of defense, etc.) and multiple agents (four services, a quasi-autonomous Joint Staff, more-or-less independent combatant commands, the National Guard, and so on), and I explore more fully the consequences of relaxing these assumptions in Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations.
9. 7. The various techniques of monitoring are discussed in greater detail in Feaver, "Delegation, Monitoring, and Civilian Control of the Military."
10. 8. Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," Armed Forces & Society 23, 2 (Winter 1996): 149-178.
11. 9. Pure working, however, does not necessarily mean that the outcomes of military action will please the civilian. This is so because the functional goal, security is itself in relation to another actor not in the principal-agent relationship: the enemy Indeed some of the things the civilian wants done may in fact work against the overall goal of providing security for the state. But if civilians ask for it, then not to provide it is shirking because civilians have a right to be wrong in a democracy. Moreover, in fulfilling the principal's functional directions, things can go wrong simply due to Murphy's Law or Clausewitzean "friction." Both the civilian and the military can share the goal of national security (and in the U.S. case, one can even stipulate this as largely true), but both the civilian and the military are imperfect judges of what is needed for national security. The principal-agent problem arises when there is disagreement over what is needed or appropriate for national security, whether or not one side is "correct" about what is in fact needed. This can be represented graphically as three points in a multidimensional space, in which each dimension represents a critical component of national security policy (e.g., force structure, grand strategy, operational plan). One point represents the policy mix that would produce true optimal security; this is what the civilian and the military ultimately want. Another point represents the civilian's desired policy mix, which is the civilian's best estimation of what is needed for security; this is what the civilian asks for. The third point represents the military's desired policy mix; this is what the military asks for. The work-shirk continuum concerns only the nearness of behavior to the civilian or military desired point, and does not directly address whether the output approximates theoretically optimal security.
12. 10. The agency model addresses civil-military relations in a democracy, where the military conceives of itself as the agent of the civilian; crucial to that conception is a recognition of the civilian's right to sanction, and hence an explicit commitment to submit to sanctions. Such an assumption is reasonable in the U.S. case. There is ample evidence that civilians are able to punish the military, if they so choose. Civilians have the ability to fire even hugely popular military officers, as Truman's dismissal of MacArthur makes clear. Many senior military officers have been sacked before and since for a wide range of offenses that can be grouped collectively under the heading of shirking.
13. 11. Of course, some defense policy issues will have a larger electoral payoff than others, regardless of whether the threat is high or low. For instance, the decision about whether to close a base in a home district will almost always be electorally more significant than a decision about whether to base a strategy on preparing to fight two or just one and one-half small wars nearly simultaneously.
14. 12. The data suggest that the locus of civilian monitoring shifted from the service departments to the OSD because the civilian secretariat within the service departments actually experienced deeper personnel cuts than their military counterparts during the same period. See data from Annual Report to the President and the Congress by the United States Department of Defense, February 1993, Table B-1; Annual Report to the President and the Congress by the United States Department of Defense, February 1994, Table C-1; Department of Defense, Civilian Manpower Statistics, June 1984, Table 4; and Department of Defense, Civilian Manpower Statistics, June 1994, Table 3.
15. 13. Data from Larry Curry, Director of Correspondence and Directives, Office of the Executive Secretary, Department of Defense, 10 March 1997.
16. 14. By the end of July 1993, for instance, nearly half of the senior DoD jobs (23) remained empty. "Clinton's Picks Faster than Bush's, Lag Reagan's," Washington Post, 25 July 1993, A8; Ann Reilly Dowd, "Hello, Washington, Anybody There? " Fortune, 26 July 1993, 18; Stephen C. LeSueur, "Women Find Easy Acceptance in DoD Male Bastion," Defense News, 6 December 1993, 14.
17. 14. By the end of July 1993, for instance, nearly half of the senior DoD jobs (23) remained empty. "Clinton's Picks Faster than Bush's, Lag Reagan's," Washington Post, 25 July 1993, A8; Ann Reilly Dowd, "Hello, Washington, Anybody There? " Fortune, 26 July 1993, 18; Stephen C. LeSueur, "Women Find Easy Acceptance in DoD Male Bastion," Defense News, 6 December 1993, 14.
18. 14. By the end of July 1993, for instance, nearly half of the senior DoD jobs (23) remained empty. "Clinton's Picks Faster than Bush's, Lag Reagan's," Washington Post, 25 July 1993, A8; Ann Reilly Dowd, "Hello, Washington, Anybody There? " Fortune, 26 July 1993, 18; Stephen C. LeSueur, "Women Find Easy Acceptance in DoD Male Bastion," Defense News, 6 December 1993, 14.
19. 15. See "Services to Do Own Study of Potential Cuts to OSD, Defense Agencies," Inside the Pentagon 13 March 1997, 12.
20. 16. This logic is examined in greater detail in Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations.
21. 17. See Thomas E. Ricks, "On American Soil: The Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society," Olin Institute Working Paper No. 3, May 1996; and Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-1996," Olin Institute Working Paper No. 13, October 1997.
22. 17. See Thomas E. Ricks, "On American Soil: The Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and U.S. Society," Olin Institute Working Paper No. 3, May 1996; and Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap between the Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-1996," Olin Institute Working Paper No. 13, October 1997.
23. 18. Charles L. Cochran and Eloise F. Malone, "A Comparison of Naval Academy Plebes and College Freshmen over Twenty Years Using the Ace's Student Information Form." Paper presented at the 1995 Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces & Society, Baltimore, MD, 20-22 October 1995.
24. 19. William Lind, Maj. John Schmitt, and Col. Gary Wilson, "Fourth Generation Warfare: Another Look," Marine Corps Gazette (December 1994), 34-37.
25. 20. For more see: John Lancaster, "Clinton and the Military: Is Gay Policy just the Opening Skirmish?" Washington Post, 1 February 1993, A10; " The Military and the Commander-in-Chief," transcript of ABC News Nightline, 30 March 1992; John Lancaster and Ann Dewey, "Storming the Pentagon," Washington Post, 9 April 1993, A1; Helen Thomas, "Clinton Seeks Improved Image with Military," United Press International, 7 May 1993.
26. 20. For more see: John Lancaster, "Clinton and the Military: Is Gay Policy just the Opening Skirmish?" Washington Post, 1 February 1993, A10; " The Military and the Commander-in-Chief," transcript of ABC News Nightline, 30 March 1992; John Lancaster and Ann Dewey, "Storming the Pentagon," Washington Post, 9 April 1993, A1; Helen Thomas, "Clinton Seeks Improved Image with Military," United Press International, 7 May 1993.
27. 20. For more see: John Lancaster, "Clinton and the Military: Is Gay Policy just the Opening Skirmish?" Washington Post, 1 February 1993, A10; " The Military and the Commander-in-Chief," transcript of ABC News Nightline, 30 March 1992; John Lancaster and Ann Dewey, "Storming the Pentagon," Washington Post, 9 April 1993, A1; Helen Thomas, "Clinton Seeks Improved Image with Military," United Press International, 7 May 1993.
28. 20. For more see: John Lancaster, "Clinton and the Military: Is Gay Policy just the Opening Skirmish?" Washington Post, 1 February 1993, A10; " The Military and the Commander-in-Chief," transcript of ABC News Nightline, 30 March 1992; John Lancaster and Ann Dewey, "Storming the Pentagon," Washington Post, 9 April 1993, A1; Helen Thomas, "Clinton Seeks Improved Image with Military," United Press International, 7 May 1993.
29. 21. Not-for-attribution interview with the author, 3 June 1994.
30. 22. The original Powell debate is found in Michael R. Gordon, "Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using Limited Force in Bosnia," New York Times, 28 September 1992, A1, A5; "Our 'No Can Do' Military," New York Times, 4 October 1992, D12; and Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992 A35.
31. 22. The original Powell debate is found in Michael R. Gordon, "Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using Limited Force in Bosnia," New York Times, 28 September 1992, A1, A5; "Our 'No Can Do' Military," New York Times, 4 October 1992, D12; and Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992 A35.
32. 22. The original Powell debate is found in Michael R. Gordon, "Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using Limited Force in Bosnia," New York Times, 28 September 1992, A1, A5; "Our 'No Can Do' Military," New York Times, 4 October 1992, D12; and Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," New York Times, 8 October 1992 A35.
33. 23. For a telling account of how Aspin's successor William Perry understood the Somalia lesson, see Bill Gertz, "Perry Talks of Somalia Lessons: Says Peacekeepers Must be Well Armed," Washington Times, 4 October 1995.
34. 24. See Michael R. Gordon, "Pentagon's Haiti Policy Focuses on Casualties," New York Times, 6 October 1994, A5.
35. 25. R. Jeffrey Smith and Dana Priest, "Troops Given Wide Range of Authority," Washington Post, 23 November 1995, 1; Eric Schmitt, "Commanders Say U.S. Plan for Bosnia Will Work," New York Times, 27 November 1995, 1; and Dana Priest, "1,400 U.S. Troops Part of Advance Group," Washington Post, 28 November 1995, 9.
36. 25. R. Jeffrey Smith and Dana Priest, "Troops Given Wide Range of Authority," Washington Post, 23 November 1995, 1; Eric Schmitt, "Commanders Say U.S. Plan for Bosnia Will Work," New York Times, 27 November 1995, 1; and Dana Priest, "1,400 U.S. Troops Part of Advance Group," Washington Post, 28 November 1995, 9.
37. 25. R. Jeffrey Smith and Dana Priest, "Troops Given Wide Range of Authority," Washington Post, 23 November 1995, 1; Eric Schmitt, "Commanders Say U.S. Plan for Bosnia Will Work," New York Times, 27 November 1995, 1; and Dana Priest, "1,400 U.S. Troops Part of Advance Group," Washington Post, 28 November 1995, 9.
38. 26. The developments I describe in the text may be part of a broader trend towards greater uncertainty in how the military will be punished. Civilian standards of due process have increasingly encroached on the military judicial system with a corresponding dramatic decrease in the number of formal courts-martial and a greater reliance by senior commanders on nonjudicial punishment. Louis Ephraim Hicks, The Effect of Technology on Social Control in U.S. Military Organizations: Trends in Court-Martial Rates From 1917-1991 (Ph.D. diss. University of Virginia, 1994, 155), and James B. Jacobs, "Legal Change within the United States Armed Forces Since World War II," Armed Forces & Society 4, 3 (May 1978): 391-421.
39. 26. The developments I describe in the text may be part of a broader trend towards greater uncertainty in how the military will be punished. Civilian standards of due process have increasingly encroached on the military judicial system with a corresponding dramatic decrease in the number of formal courts-martial and a greater reliance by senior commanders on nonjudicial punishment. Louis Ephraim Hicks, The Effect of Technology on Social Control in U.S. Military Organizations: Trends in Court-Martial Rates From 1917-1991 (Ph.D. diss. University of Virginia, 1994, 155), and James B. Jacobs, "Legal Change within the United States Armed Forces Since World War II," Armed Forces & Society 4, 3 (May 1978): 391-421.
40. 27. As one editorial opined, "administration policies on key issues - ranging from changes in force structures to women in combat - run into unnecessary trouble because civilians whose jobs it would be to implement them were not in place," "The Pentagon's Missing Civilians," The Washington Post, 27 June 1993, C6.
41. 28. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 290-96.
42. 29. Powell himself, of course, claimed he was merely fulfilling his statutory responsibilities as advisor-in-chief and, had civilian principals made a decision to bomb, he would have carried out the orders unequivocally. Thus, if we code this as shirking we must recognize that it is a far cry from the most egregious forms of shirking imaginable in a civil-military context. See "Exchange on Civil-Military Relations" with Colin Powell, John Lehman, William Odom, Samuel Huntington and Richard Kohn, National Interest 36 (Summer 1994): 23-31.
43. 30. "Who's in Charge of the Military," New York Times, 26 January 1993, A18.
44. 31. "Clinton's Quick Steps to Better Relations; After Summit Jog, General Snubbed at White House; Has Warm Words for President," Washington Post, 6 April 1993, A7.
45. 32. Maj. Gen. Harold N. Campbell reportedly made the comments at an official Air Force banquet in the Netherlands. Initially, the White House seemed skittish in dealing with this gross violation of military protocol; one staff member complained, "What should we do? Fire someone with a Silver Star?" The chain of command rallied, however, and General Campbell resigned in disgrace. John Lancaster, "Accused of Ridiculing Clinton, General Faces Air Force Probe," Washington Post, 8 June 1993, A1; John Lancaster, "Air Force General Sets Retirement," Washington Post, 19 June 1993, A1.
46. 32. Maj. Gen. Harold N. Campbell reportedly made the comments at an official Air Force banquet in the Netherlands. Initially, the White House seemed skittish in dealing with this gross violation of military protocol; one staff member complained, "What should we do? Fire someone with a Silver Star?" The chain of command rallied, however, and General Campbell resigned in disgrace. John Lancaster, "Accused of Ridiculing Clinton, General Faces Air Force Probe," Washington Post, 8 June 1993, A1; John Lancaster, "Air Force General Sets Retirement," Washington Post, 19 June 1993, A1.
47. 32. Maj. Gen. Harold N. Campbell reportedly made the comments at an official Air Force banquet in the Netherlands. Initially, the White House seemed skittish in dealing with this gross violation of military protocol; one staff member complained, "What should we do? Fire someone with a Silver Star?" The chain of command rallied, however, and General Campbell resigned in disgrace. John Lancaster, "Accused of Ridiculing Clinton, General Faces Air Force Probe," Washington Post, 8 June 1993, A1; John Lancaster, "Air Force General Sets Retirement," Washington Post, 19 June 1993, A1.
48. 33. James Webb, "The War on Military Culture," he Weekly Standard 2, 18, 20 January 1997, 17-22.
49. 34. The existence of confusion is all too easy to document. See, for example, the confusion surrounding whether and whom to punish for the terrorist bombing of the Air Force base in Dharan; see John Kifner, "In Saudi Base Bombing, Debate on Placing Blame," New York Times, 6 December 1996, 1; and Eric Schmitt, "Air Force Reviewing Exoneration of General in Attack," New York Times, 18 February 1997, 1. See also the treatment of Admiral Macke, who was summarily fired for making insensitive remarks in the 1995 Okinawa rape case. "U.S. Seeks to Defuse Controversy Over Admiral's Remarks," Reuters, 19 November 1995. See also the turmoil following Admiral Boorda's suicide. Roger Charles, "It's a War for Soul of U.S. Military," Baltimore Sun, 2 June 1996, 1; John Lehman, "The Navy's Enemies," Wall Street Journal, 21 May 1996, 22. Nowhere is the problem more evident than in the military's desperate attempts to adjust to the presence of women in the ranks and changing social mores. The presence of women has intensified the military's effort to regulate sex between consenting adults and this has undoubtedly exacerbated confusion over what sorts of behavior will result in punishment. Tamara Jones, "U.S. Military Takes Aim at Adultery: In the Wake of Sex Scandals, Services Mete Out Harsh Penalties for Illicit Romance," Washington Post 28 April 1997, 1; and Tamara Jones, "The Pilot's Cloudy Future," The Washington Post, 29 April 1997, D1.
50. 34. The existence of confusion is all too easy to document. See, for example, the confusion surrounding whether and whom to punish for the terrorist bombing of the Air Force base in Dharan; see John Kifner, "In Saudi Base Bombing, Debate on Placing Blame," New York Times, 6 December 1996, 1; and Eric Schmitt, "Air Force Reviewing Exoneration of General in Attack," New York Times, 18 February 1997, 1. See also the treatment of Admiral Macke, who was summarily fired for making insensitive remarks in the 1995 Okinawa rape case. "U.S. Seeks to Defuse Controversy Over Admiral's Remarks," Reuters, 19 November 1995. See also the turmoil following Admiral Boorda's suicide. Roger Charles, "It's a War for Soul of U.S. Military," Baltimore Sun, 2 June 1996, 1; John Lehman, "The Navy's Enemies," Wall Street Journal, 21 May 1996, 22. Nowhere is the problem more evident than in the military's desperate attempts to adjust to the presence of women in the ranks and changing social mores. The presence of women has intensified the military's effort to regulate sex between consenting adults and this has undoubtedly exacerbated confusion over what sorts of behavior will result in punishment. Tamara Jones, "U.S. Military Takes Aim at Adultery: In the Wake of Sex Scandals, Services Mete Out Harsh Penalties for Illicit Romance," Washington Post 28 April 1997, 1; and Tamara Jones, "The Pilot's Cloudy Future," The Washington Post, 29 April 1997, D1.
51. 34. The existence of confusion is all too easy to document. See, for example, the confusion surrounding whether and whom to punish for the terrorist bombing of the Air Force base in Dharan; see John Kifner, "In Saudi Base Bombing, Debate on Placing Blame," New York Times, 6 December 1996, 1; and Eric Schmitt, "Air Force Reviewing Exoneration of General in Attack," New York Times, 18 February 1997, 1. See also the treatment of Admiral Macke, who was summarily fired for making insensitive remarks in the 1995 Okinawa rape case. "U.S. Seeks to Defuse Controversy Over Admiral's Remarks," Reuters, 19 November 1995. See also the turmoil following Admiral Boorda's suicide. Roger Charles, "It's a War for Soul of U.S. Military," Baltimore Sun, 2 June 1996, 1; John Lehman, "The Navy's Enemies," Wall Street Journal, 21 May 1996, 22. Nowhere is the problem more evident than in the military's desperate attempts to adjust to the presence of women in the ranks and changing social mores. The presence of women has intensified the military's effort to regulate sex between consenting adults and this has undoubtedly exacerbated confusion over what sorts of behavior will result in punishment. Tamara Jones, "U.S. Military Takes Aim at Adultery: In the Wake of Sex Scandals, Services Mete Out Harsh Penalties for Illicit Romance," Washington Post 28 April 1997, 1; and Tamara Jones, "The Pilot's Cloudy Future," The Washington Post, 29 April 1997, D1.
52. 34. The existence of confusion is all too easy to document. See, for example, the confusion surrounding whether and whom to punish for the terrorist bombing of the Air Force base in Dharan; see John Kifner, "In Saudi Base Bombing, Debate on Placing Blame," New York Times, 6 December 1996, 1; and Eric Schmitt, "Air Force Reviewing Exoneration of General in Attack," New York Times, 18 February 1997, 1. See also the treatment of Admiral Macke, who was summarily fired for making insensitive remarks in the 1995 Okinawa rape case. "U.S. Seeks to Defuse Controversy Over Admiral's Remarks," Reuters, 19 November 1995. See also the turmoil following Admiral Boorda's suicide. Roger Charles, "It's a War for Soul of U.S. Military," Baltimore Sun, 2 June 1996, 1; John Lehman, "The Navy's Enemies," Wall Street Journal, 21 May 1996, 22. Nowhere is the problem more evident than in the military's desperate attempts to adjust to the presence of women in the ranks and changing social mores. The presence of women has intensified the military's effort to regulate sex between consenting adults and this has undoubtedly exacerbated confusion over what sorts of behavior will result in punishment. Tamara Jones, "U.S. Military Takes Aim at Adultery: In the Wake of Sex Scandals, Services Mete Out Harsh Penalties for Illicit Romance," Washington Post 28 April 1997, 1; and Tamara Jones, "The Pilot's Cloudy Future," The Washington Post, 29 April 1997, D1.
53. 34. The existence of confusion is all too easy to document. See, for example, the confusion surrounding whether and whom to punish for the terrorist bombing of the Air Force base in Dharan; see John Kifner, "In Saudi Base Bombing, Debate on Placing Blame," New York Times, 6 December 1996, 1; and Eric Schmitt, "Air Force Reviewing Exoneration of General in Attack," New York Times, 18 February 1997, 1. See also the treatment of Admiral Macke, who was summarily fired for making insensitive remarks in the 1995 Okinawa rape case. "U.S. Seeks to Defuse Controversy Over Admiral's Remarks," Reuters, 19 November 1995. See also the turmoil following Admiral Boorda's suicide. Roger Charles, "It's a War for Soul of U.S. Military," Baltimore Sun, 2 June 1996, 1; John Lehman, "The Navy's Enemies," Wall Street Journal, 21 May 1996, 22. Nowhere is the problem more evident than in the military's desperate attempts to adjust to the presence of women in the ranks and changing social mores. The presence of women has intensified the military's effort to regulate sex between consenting adults and this has undoubtedly exacerbated confusion over what sorts of behavior will result in punishment. Tamara Jones, "U.S. Military Takes Aim at Adultery: In the Wake of Sex Scandals, Services Mete Out Harsh Penalties for Illicit Romance," Washington Post 28 April 1997, 1; and Tamara Jones, "The Pilot's Cloudy Future," The Washington Post, 29 April 1997, D1.
54. 34. The existence of confusion is all too easy to document. See, for example, the confusion surrounding whether and whom to punish for the terrorist bombing of the Air Force base in Dharan; see John Kifner, "In Saudi Base Bombing, Debate on Placing Blame," New York Times, 6 December 1996, 1; and Eric Schmitt, "Air Force Reviewing Exoneration of General in Attack," New York Times, 18 February 1997, 1. See also the treatment of Admiral Macke, who was summarily fired for making insensitive remarks in the 1995 Okinawa rape case. "U.S. Seeks to Defuse Controversy Over Admiral's Remarks," Reuters, 19 November 1995. See also the turmoil following Admiral Boorda's suicide. Roger Charles, "It's a War for Soul of U.S. Military," Baltimore Sun, 2 June 1996, 1; John Lehman, "The Navy's Enemies," Wall Street Journal, 21 May 1996, 22. Nowhere is the problem more evident than in the military's desperate attempts to adjust to the presence of women in the ranks and changing social mores. The presence of women has intensified the military's effort to regulate sex between consenting adults and this has undoubtedly exacerbated confusion over what sorts of behavior will result in punishment. Tamara Jones, "U.S. Military Takes Aim at Adultery: In the Wake of Sex Scandals, Services Mete Out Harsh Penalties for Illicit Romance," Washington Post 28 April 1997, 1; and Tamara Jones, "The Pilot's Cloudy Future," The Washington Post, 29 April 1997, D1.
55. 34. The existence of confusion is all too easy to document. See, for example, the confusion surrounding whether and whom to punish for the terrorist bombing of the Air Force base in Dharan; see John Kifner, "In Saudi Base Bombing, Debate on Placing Blame," New York Times, 6 December 1996, 1; and Eric Schmitt, "Air Force Reviewing Exoneration of General in Attack," New York Times, 18 February 1997, 1. See also the treatment of Admiral Macke, who was summarily fired for making insensitive remarks in the 1995 Okinawa rape case. "U.S. Seeks to Defuse Controversy Over Admiral's Remarks," Reuters, 19 November 1995. See also the turmoil following Admiral Boorda's suicide. Roger Charles, "It's a War for Soul of U.S. Military," Baltimore Sun, 2 June 1996, 1; John Lehman, "The Navy's Enemies," Wall Street Journal, 21 May 1996, 22. Nowhere is the problem more evident than in the military's desperate attempts to adjust to the presence of women in the ranks and changing social mores. The presence of women has intensified the military's effort to regulate sex between consenting adults and this has undoubtedly exacerbated confusion over what sorts of behavior will result in punishment. Tamara Jones, "U.S. Military Takes Aim at Adultery: In the Wake of Sex Scandals, Services Mete Out Harsh Penalties for Illicit Romance," Washington Post 28 April 1997, 1; and Tamara Jones, "The Pilot's Cloudy Future," The Washington Post, 29 April 1997, D1.
56. 34. The existence of confusion is all too easy to document. See, for example, the confusion surrounding whether and whom to punish for the terrorist bombing of the Air Force base in Dharan; see John Kifner, "In Saudi Base Bombing, Debate on Placing Blame," New York Times, 6 December 1996, 1; and Eric Schmitt, "Air Force Reviewing Exoneration of General in Attack," New York Times, 18 February 1997, 1. See also the treatment of Admiral Macke, who was summarily fired for making insensitive remarks in the 1995 Okinawa rape case. "U.S. Seeks to Defuse Controversy Over Admiral's Remarks," Reuters, 19 November 1995. See also the turmoil following Admiral Boorda's suicide. Roger Charles, "It's a War for Soul of U.S. Military," Baltimore Sun, 2 June 1996, 1; John Lehman, "The Navy's Enemies," Wall Street Journal, 21 May 1996, 22. Nowhere is the problem more evident than in the military's desperate attempts to adjust to the presence of women in the ranks and changing social mores. The presence of women has intensified the military's effort to regulate sex between consenting adults and this has undoubtedly exacerbated confusion over what sorts of behavior will result in punishment. Tamara Jones, "U.S. Military Takes Aim at Adultery: In the Wake of Sex Scandals, Services Mete Out Harsh Penalties for Illicit Romance," Washington Post 28 April 1997, 1; and amara Jones, "The Pilot's Cloudy Future," The Washington Post, 29 April 1997, D1.
57. 35. See Michael Desch, this issue.
58. 36. While I disagree with her interpretation of the cases, Deborah Avant convincingly documents the civil-military conflict in Deborah D. Avant, "U.S. Military Reluctance to Respond to Post-Cold War Low-Level Threats," Security Studies 6, 2 (Winter 1996/91): 51-90.
59. 37. Michael R. Gordon, "Report by Powell Challenges Calls to Revise Military," New York Times, 31 December 1992, A1 and A10; and Eric Schmitt, "The Top Solider is Torn between 2 Loyalties," New York Times, 6 February 1993, A1 and A12.
60. 37. Michael R. Gordon, "Report by Powell Challenges Calls to Revise Military," New York Times, 31 December 1992, A1 and A10; and Eric Schmitt, "The Top Solider is Torn between 2 Loyalties," New York Times, 6 February 1993, A1 and A12.
61. 38. The model does not assume away the possibility of a coup, although the probability that a coup would be endogenously generated by the relationship as modeled is remote. Perhaps extreme values predicting high levels of shirking combined with either extremely low monitoring (so as to approximate a de facto coup) or extremely intrusive monitoring (so as to exacerbate the agent's frustration) could create the conditions for a coup. In any case, the dependent variable is not coup/no-coup, and my argument about the alleged American crisis explicitly links the current troubles to friction in the relationship, rather than to the presence or absence of a coup.