Ownership structure as corporate governance mechanism: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

Economics of Planning

Volumn 34, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 53-72

  Chen, J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GREENWICH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agency cost; Corporate governance; Corporate performance; Ownership structure

Indexed keywords

GOVERNANCE APPROACH; INDUSTRIAL POLICY; INDUSTRIAL REGULATION; MANUFACTURING; PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT;

CHINA;

EID: 0035040759     PISSN: 00130451     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1017548432111     Document Type: Article

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