Stabilizing the boundary between US politics and science: The rôle of the office of technology transfer as a boundary organization

Social Studies of Science

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 87-111

  Guston, David H ^a  

^a RUTGERS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; BIOTECHNOLOGY; HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION; HISTORY; POLITICS; SCIENCE; SOCIOLOGY; TECHNIQUE; TECHNOLOGY; UNITED STATES;

BIOTECHNOLOGY; HISTORY, 20TH CENTURY; METHODS; NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH (U.S.); POLITICS; SCIENCE; SOCIOLOGY, MEDICAL; TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0033073891     PISSN: 03063127     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/030631299029001004     Document Type: Article

References (91)

1. Thomas F. Gieryn, 'Boundaries of Science', in Sheila Jasanoff, Gerald E. Markle, James C. Petersen and Trevor Pinch (eds), Handbook of Science and Technology Studies (Thousand Oaks, CA, London & New Delhi: 4S/Sage Publications, 1995), 393-443.
2. Ibid., 394.
3. For general discussions of principal-agent theory, see, inter alia: Kenneth J. Arrow, 'The Economics of Agency', in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 33-54; James Samuel Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press [Harvard], 1990); Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1984), 739-77. For applications to science policy, see: Dietmar Braun, 'Who Governs Intermediary Organizations?: Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making', Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April/June 1993), 135-62; David H. Guston, 'Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), 229-40; Arie Rip, 'The Post-Modern Research System', paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Observatoire des Sciences et Techniques, the Science Policy Research Unit and Nature (Paris, 28-29 September 1995, mimeo); Stephen Turner, 'Directions for Future Research', Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 9, Nos 2/3 (Summer/Fall 1996), 99-105; Chris Caswill, 'Challenges and Interactions: A Different Story for British Social Science?', paper presented at an NOS-S meeting (Oslo, 5 May 1997, mimeo); and two papers presented at a conference on 'The Need for a New Economics of Science' (Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, 15 March 1997, mimeo): Barend van der Meulen, 'Government Science Policies as a Principal-Agent Game', and S. Turner, 'Scientists as Agents and Representatives: A Coasian Approach'.
4. For general discussions of principal-agent theory, see, inter alia: Kenneth J. Arrow, 'The Economics of Agency', in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 33-54; James Samuel Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press [Harvard], 1990); Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1984), 739-77. For applications to science policy, see: Dietmar Braun, 'Who Governs Intermediary Organizations?: Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making', Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April/June 1993), 135-62; David H. Guston, 'Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), 229-40; Arie Rip, 'The Post-Modern Research System', paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Observatoire des Sciences et Techniques, the Science Policy Research Unit and Nature (Paris, 28-29 September 1995, mimeo); Stephen Turner, 'Directions for Future Research', Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 9, Nos 2/3 (Summer/Fall 1996), 99-105; Chris Caswill, 'Challenges and Interactions: A Different Story for British Social Science?', paper presented at an NOS-S meeting (Oslo, 5 May 1997, mimeo); and two papers presented at a conference on 'The Need for a New Economics of Science' (Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, 15 March 1997, mimeo): Barend van der Meulen, 'Government Science Policies as a Principal-Agent Game', and S. Turner, 'Scientists as Agents and Representatives: A Coasian Approach'.
5. For general discussions of principal-agent theory, see, inter alia: Kenneth J. Arrow, 'The Economics of Agency', in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 33-54; James Samuel Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press [Harvard], 1990); Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1984), 739-77. For applications to science policy, see: Dietmar Braun, 'Who Governs Intermediary Organizations?: Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making', Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April/June 1993), 135-62; David H. Guston, 'Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), 229-40; Arie Rip, 'The Post-Modern Research System', paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Observatoire des Sciences et Techniques, the Science Policy Research Unit and Nature (Paris, 28-29 September 1995, mimeo); Stephen Turner, 'Directions for Future Research', Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 9, Nos 2/3 (Summer/Fall 1996), 99-105; Chris Caswill, 'Challenges and Interactions: A Different Story for British Social Science?', paper presented at an NOS-S meeting (Oslo, 5 May 1997, mimeo); and two papers presented at a conference on 'The Need for a New Economics of Science' (Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, 15 March 1997, mimeo): Barend van der Meulen, 'Government Science Policies as a Principal-Agent Game', and S. Turner, 'Scientists as Agents and Representatives: A Coasian Approach'.
6. For general discussions of principal-agent theory, see, inter alia: Kenneth J. Arrow, 'The Economics of Agency', in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 33-54; James Samuel Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press [Harvard], 1990); Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1984), 739-77. For applications to science policy, see: Dietmar Braun, 'Who Governs Intermediary Organizations?: Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making', Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April/June 1993), 135-62; David H. Guston, 'Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), 229-40; Arie Rip, 'The Post-Modern Research System', paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Observatoire des Sciences et Techniques, the Science Policy Research Unit and Nature (Paris, 28-29 September 1995, mimeo); Stephen Turner, 'Directions for Future Research', Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 9, Nos 2/3 (Summer/Fall 1996), 99-105; Chris Caswill, 'Challenges and Interactions: A Different Story for British Social Science?', paper presented at an NOS-S meeting (Oslo, 5 May 1997, mimeo); and two papers presented at a conference on 'The Need for a New Economics of Science' (Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, 15 March 1997, mimeo): Barend van der Meulen, 'Government Science Policies as a Principal-Agent Game', and S. Turner, 'Scientists as Agents and Representatives: A Coasian Approach'.
7. For general discussions of principal-agent theory, see, inter alia: Kenneth J. Arrow, 'The Economics of Agency', in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 33-54; James Samuel Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press [Harvard], 1990); Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1984), 739-77. For applications to science policy, see: Dietmar Braun, 'Who Governs Intermediary Organizations?: Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making', Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April/June 1993), 135-62; David H. Guston, 'Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), 229-40; Arie Rip, 'The Post-Modern Research System', paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Observatoire des Sciences et Techniques, the Science Policy Research Unit and Nature (Paris, 28-29 September 1995, mimeo); Stephen Turner, 'Directions for Future Research', Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 9, Nos 2/3 (Summer/Fall 1996), 99-105; Chris Caswill, 'Challenges and Interactions: A Different Story for British Social Science?', paper presented at an NOS-S meeting (Oslo, 5 May 1997, mimeo); and two papers presented at a conference on 'The Need for a New Economics of Science' (Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, 15 March 1997, mimeo): Barend van der Meulen, 'Government Science Policies as a Principal-Agent Game', and S. Turner, 'Scientists as Agents and Representatives: A Coasian Approach'.
8. For general discussions of principal-agent theory, see, inter alia: Kenneth J. Arrow, 'The Economics of Agency', in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 33-54; James Samuel Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press [Harvard], 1990); Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1984), 739-77. For applications to science policy, see: Dietmar Braun, 'Who Governs Intermediary Organizations?: Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making', Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April/June 1993), 135-62; David H. Guston, 'Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), 229-40; Arie Rip, 'The Post-Modern Research System', paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Observatoire des Sciences et Techniques, the Science Policy Research Unit and Nature (Paris, 28-29 September 1995, mimeo); Stephen Turner, 'Directions for Future Research', Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 9, Nos 2/3 (Summer/Fall 1996), 99-105; Chris Caswill, 'Challenges and Interactions: A Different Story for British Social Science?', paper presented at an NOS-S meeting (Oslo, 5 May 1997, mimeo); and two papers presented at a conference on 'The Need for a New Economics of Science' (Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, 15 March 1997, mimeo): Barend van der Meulen, 'Government Science Policies as a Principal-Agent Game', and S. Turner, 'Scientists as Agents and Representatives: A Coasian Approach'.
9. For general discussions of principal-agent theory, see, inter alia: Kenneth J. Arrow, 'The Economics of Agency', in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 33-54; James Samuel Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press [Harvard], 1990); Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1984), 739-77. For applications to science policy, see: Dietmar Braun, 'Who Governs Intermediary Organizations?: Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making', Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April/June 1993), 135-62; David H. Guston, 'Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), 229-40; Arie Rip, 'The Post-Modern Research System', paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Observatoire des Sciences et Techniques, the Science Policy Research Unit and Nature (Paris, 28-29 September 1995, mimeo); Stephen Turner, 'Directions for Future Research', Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 9, Nos 2/3 (Summer/Fall 1996), 99-105; Chris Caswill, 'Challenges and Interactions: A Different Story for British Social Science?', paper presented at an NOS-S meeting (Oslo, 5 May 1997, mimeo); and two papers presented at a conference on 'The Need for a New Economics of Science' (Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, 15 March 1997, mimeo): Barend van der Meulen, 'Government Science Policies as a Principal-Agent Game', and S. Turner, 'Scientists as Agents and Representatives: A Coasian Approach'.
10. For general discussions of principal-agent theory, see, inter alia: Kenneth J. Arrow, 'The Economics of Agency', in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 33-54; James Samuel Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press [Harvard], 1990); Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1984), 739-77. For applications to science policy, see: Dietmar Braun, 'Who Governs Intermediary Organizations?: Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making', Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April/June 1993), 135-62; David H. Guston, 'Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), 229-40; Arie Rip, 'The Post-Modern Research System', paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Observatoire des Sciences et Techniques, the Science Policy Research Unit and Nature (Paris, 28-29 September 1995, mimeo); Stephen Turner, 'Directions for Future Research', Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 9, Nos 2/3 (Summer/Fall 1996), 99-105; Chris Caswill, 'Challenges and Interactions: A Different Story for British Social Science?', paper presented at an NOS-S meeting (Oslo, 5 May 1997, mimeo); and two papers presented at a conference on 'The Need for a New Economics of Science' (Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, 15 March 1997, mimeo): Barend van der Meulen, 'Government Science Policies as a Principal-Agent Game', and S. Turner, 'Scientists as Agents and Representatives: A Coasian Approach'.
11. For general discussions of principal-agent theory, see, inter alia: Kenneth J. Arrow, 'The Economics of Agency', in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 33-54; James Samuel Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press [Harvard], 1990); Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1984), 739-77. For applications to science policy, see: Dietmar Braun, 'Who Governs Intermediary Organizations?: Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making', Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April/June 1993), 135-62; David H. Guston, 'Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), 229-40; Arie Rip, 'The Post-Modern Research System', paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Observatoire des Sciences et Techniques, the Science Policy Research Unit and Nature (Paris, 28-29 September 1995, mimeo); Stephen Turner, 'Directions for Future Research', Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 9, Nos 2/3 (Summer/Fall 1996), 99-105; Chris Caswill, 'Challenges and Interactions: A Different Story for British Social Science?', paper presented at an NOS-S meeting (Oslo, 5 May 1997, mimeo); and two papers presented at a conference on 'The Need for a New Economics of Science' (Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, 15 March 1997, mimeo): Barend van der Meulen, 'Government Science Policies as a Principal-Agent Game', and S. Turner, 'Scientists as Agents and Representatives: A Coasian Approach'.
12. For general discussions of principal-agent theory, see, inter alia: Kenneth J. Arrow, 'The Economics of Agency', in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 33-54; James Samuel Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press [Harvard], 1990); Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1984), 739-77. For applications to science policy, see: Dietmar Braun, 'Who Governs Intermediary Organizations?: Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making', Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April/June 1993), 135-62; David H. Guston, 'Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), 229-40; Arie Rip, 'The Post-Modern Research System', paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Observatoire des Sciences et Techniques, the Science Policy Research Unit and Nature (Paris, 28-29 September 1995, mimeo); Stephen Turner, 'Directions for Future Research', Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 9, Nos 2/3 (Summer/Fall 1996), 99-105; Chris Caswill, 'Challenges and Interactions: A Different Story for British Social Science?', paper presented at an NOS-S meeting (Oslo, 5 May 1997, mimeo); and two papers presented at a conference on 'The Need for a New Economics of Science' (Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, 15 March 1997, mimeo): Barend van der Meulen, 'Government Science Policies as a Principal-Agent Game', and S. Turner, 'Scientists as Agents and Representatives: A Coasian Approach'.
13. For general discussions of principal-agent theory, see, inter alia: Kenneth J. Arrow, 'The Economics of Agency', in John W. Pratt and Richard J. Zeckhauser (eds), Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1991), 33-54; James Samuel Coleman, Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press [Harvard], 1990); Terry M. Moe, 'The New Economics of Organization', American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, No. 4 (November 1984), 739-77. For applications to science policy, see: Dietmar Braun, 'Who Governs Intermediary Organizations?: Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making', Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 13, No. 2 (April/June 1993), 135-62; David H. Guston, 'Principal-Agent Theory and the Structure of Science Policy', Science and Public Policy, Vol. 23, No. 4 (August 1996), 229-40; Arie Rip, 'The Post-Modern Research System', paper presented at a conference sponsored by the Observatoire des Sciences et Techniques, the Science Policy Research Unit and Nature (Paris, 28-29 September 1995, mimeo); Stephen Turner, 'Directions for Future Research', Knowledge and Policy, Vol. 9, Nos 2/3 (Summer/Fall 1996), 99-105; Chris Caswill, 'Challenges and Interactions: A Different Story for British Social Science?', paper presented at an NOS-S meeting (Oslo, 5 May 1997, mimeo); and two papers presented at a conference on 'The Need for a New Economics of Science' (Notre Dame University, South Bend, Indiana, 15 March 1997, mimeo): Barend van der Meulen, 'Government Science Policies as a Principal-Agent Game', and S. Turner, 'Scientists as Agents and Representatives: A Coasian Approach'.
14. This perspective on the 'structuring' of policy is drawn from Daniel A. Mazmanian and Paul A. Sabatier, Implementation and Public Policy (Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman, 1983).
15. Ezrahi is not necessarily fearful, however (cf. Winner): see Y. Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press); L. Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1977).
16. Ezrahi is not necessarily fearful, however (cf. Winner): see Y. Ezrahi, The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press); L. Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1977).
17. For examples of this fear, see, for example: Gerald Holton, 'The Value of Science at the "End of the Modern Era" ', in Forum Proceedings, Ethics, Values and the Promise of Science (Research Triangle Park, MD: Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society, 1993), 115-32; Holton, Science and Anti-Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. Chapter 6; and Paul R. Gross, Norman Levitt and Martin W. Lewis (eds), The Flight from Science and Reason, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 775 (24 June 1996), passim.
18. For examples of this fear, see, for example: Gerald Holton, 'The Value of Science at the "End of the Modern Era" ', in Forum Proceedings, Ethics, Values and the Promise of Science (Research Triangle Park, MD: Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society, 1993), 115-32; Holton, Science and Anti-Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. Chapter 6; and Paul R. Gross, Norman Levitt and Martin W. Lewis (eds), The Flight from Science and Reason, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 775 (24 June 1996), passim.
19. For examples of this fear, see, for example: Gerald Holton, 'The Value of Science at the "End of the Modern Era" ', in Forum Proceedings, Ethics, Values and the Promise of Science (Research Triangle Park, MD: Sigma Xi, The Scientific Research Society, 1993), 115-32; Holton, Science and Anti-Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. Chapter 6; and Paul R. Gross, Norman Levitt and Martin W. Lewis (eds), The Flight from Science and Reason, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, Vol. 775 (24 June 1996), passim.
20. Such work includes: Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone Should Know about Science (Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Dorothy Nelkin, 'The Public Face of Science: What Can We Learn from Disputes?', in David H. Guston and Kenneth Keniston (eds), The Fragile Contract: University Science and the Federal Government (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 101-17; Bruce Lewenstein, 'From Fax to Facts: Communication in the Cold Fusion Saga', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 25, No. 3 (August 1995), 403-36; and Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (eds), Misunderstanding Science?: The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology (Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
21. Such work includes: Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone Should Know about Science (Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Dorothy Nelkin, 'The Public Face of Science: What Can We Learn from Disputes?', in David H. Guston and Kenneth Keniston (eds), The Fragile Contract: University Science and the Federal Government (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 101-17; Bruce Lewenstein, 'From Fax to Facts: Communication in the Cold Fusion Saga', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 25, No. 3 (August 1995), 403-36; and Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (eds), Misunderstanding Science?: The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology (Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
22. Such work includes: Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone Should Know about Science (Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Dorothy Nelkin, 'The Public Face of Science: What Can We Learn from Disputes?', in David H. Guston and Kenneth Keniston (eds), The Fragile Contract: University Science and the Federal Government (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 101-17; Bruce Lewenstein, 'From Fax to Facts: Communication in the Cold Fusion Saga', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 25, No. 3 (August 1995), 403-36; and Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (eds), Misunderstanding Science?: The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology (Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
23. Such work includes: Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone Should Know about Science (Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Dorothy Nelkin, 'The Public Face of Science: What Can We Learn from Disputes?', in David H. Guston and Kenneth Keniston (eds), The Fragile Contract: University Science and the Federal Government (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), 101-17; Bruce Lewenstein, 'From Fax to Facts: Communication in the Cold Fusion Saga', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 25, No. 3 (August 1995), 403-36; and Alan Irwin and Brian Wynne (eds), Misunderstanding Science?: The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology (Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
24. Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). For a similar perspective on science and the courts, see S. Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
25. Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). For a similar perspective on science and the courts, see S. Jasanoff, Science at the Bar: Law, Science, and Technology in America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
26. Susan Leigh Star and James R. Griesemer, 'Institutional Ecology, "Translations" and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-39', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 19, No. 3 (August 1989), 387-420, at 393.
27. Joan H. Fujimura, 'Crafting Science: Standardized Packages, Boundary Objects, and "Translation" ', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Culture and Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 168-211. Simon Shackley and Brian Wynne also modify Star and Griesemer's 'boundary objects' to describe 'boundary-ordering devices' and 'anchoring devices' - rhetorics that allow actors to negotiate uncertainty across many domains. See S. Shackley and B. Wynne, 'Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change Science and Policy: Boundary-Ordering Devices and Authority', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 1996), 275-302; Jeroen van der Sluijs, Josée van Eijndhoven, Shackley and Wynne, 'Anchoring Devices in Science for Policy: The Case of Consensus around Climate Sensitivity', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, No. 2 (April 1998), 291-323. Because such boundary-ordering devices may be less durable or reproducible than boundary objects, they are less important to my inquiry, which is more concerned with the production of stability.
28. Joan H. Fujimura, 'Crafting Science: Standardized Packages, Boundary Objects, and "Translation" ', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Culture and Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 168-211. Simon Shackley and Brian Wynne also modify Star and Griesemer's 'boundary objects' to describe 'boundary-ordering devices' and 'anchoring devices' - rhetorics that allow actors to negotiate uncertainty across many domains. See S. Shackley and B. Wynne, 'Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change Science and Policy: Boundary-Ordering Devices and Authority', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 1996), 275-302; Jeroen van der Sluijs, Josée van Eijndhoven, Shackley and Wynne, 'Anchoring Devices in Science for Policy: The Case of Consensus around Climate Sensitivity', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, No. 2 (April 1998), 291-323. Because such boundary-ordering devices may be less durable or reproducible than boundary objects, they are less important to my inquiry, which is more concerned with the production of stability.
29. Joan H. Fujimura, 'Crafting Science: Standardized Packages, Boundary Objects, and "Translation" ', in Andrew Pickering (ed.), Science as Culture and Practice (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 168-211. Simon Shackley and Brian Wynne also modify Star and Griesemer's 'boundary objects' to describe 'boundary-ordering devices' and 'anchoring devices' - rhetorics that allow actors to negotiate uncertainty across many domains. See S. Shackley and B. Wynne, 'Representing Uncertainty in Global Climate Change Science and Policy: Boundary-Ordering Devices and Authority', Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Summer 1996), 275-302; Jeroen van der Sluijs, Josée van Eijndhoven, Shackley and Wynne, 'Anchoring Devices in Science for Policy: The Case of Consensus around Climate Sensitivity', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 28, No. 2 (April 1998), 291-323. Because such boundary-ordering devices may be less durable or reproducible than boundary objects, they are less important to my inquiry, which is more concerned with the production of stability.
30. Fujimura, op. cit. note 10, 169.
31. Ibid., 180.
32. Kelly Moore, 'Organizing Integrity: American Science and the Creation of Public Interest Organizations, 1955-1975', American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 6 (May 1996), 1592-1627, at 1598.
33. Ibid., 1599. Daniel Lee Kleinman adopts Paul Hoch's concept of intermediate' or 'boundary' élites - people like Vannevar Bush who, with accumulated social capital in both science and politics, readily spanned both realms - to help explain policy outcomes such as the creation of the US National Science Foundation. Kleinman's boundary élite perform largely the same bridging function as Moore's public-interest organizations, but in making no reference to the constructivist perspective on boundaries, Kleinman implicitly accepts that there were separate realms of science and politics that needed bridging, rather than some other arrangement. Similarly, Hoch describes the mediating rôle of these élites within the 'military-industrial-scientific alliance' with little concern for how the actors involved negotiate the boundaries within that alliance. See: D.L. Kleinman, Politics and the Endless Frontier: Postwar Research Policy in the United States (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); P.K. Hoch, 'The Crystallization of a Strategic Alliance: The American Physics Elite and the Military in the 1940s', in Everett Mendelsohn, Merritt Roe Smith and Peter Weingart (eds), Science, Technology and the Military, Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook, No. 12 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 87-116.
34. Ibid., 1599. Daniel Lee Kleinman adopts Paul Hoch's concept of intermediate' or 'boundary' élites - people like Vannevar Bush who, with accumulated social capital in both science and politics, readily spanned both realms - to help explain policy outcomes such as the creation of the US National Science Foundation. Kleinman's boundary élite perform largely the same bridging function as Moore's public-interest organizations, but in making no reference to the constructivist perspective on boundaries, Kleinman implicitly accepts that there were separate realms of science and politics that needed bridging, rather than some other arrangement. Similarly, Hoch describes the mediating rôle of these élites within the 'military-industrial-scientific alliance' with little concern for how the actors involved negotiate the boundaries within that alliance. See: D.L. Kleinman, Politics and the Endless Frontier: Postwar Research Policy in the United States (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); P.K. Hoch, 'The Crystallization of a Strategic Alliance: The American Physics Elite and the Military in the 1940s', in Everett Mendelsohn, Merritt Roe Smith and Peter Weingart (eds), Science, Technology and the Military, Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook, No. 12 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 87-116.
35. Ibid., 1599. Daniel Lee Kleinman adopts Paul Hoch's concept of intermediate' or 'boundary' élites - people like Vannevar Bush who, with accumulated social capital in both science and politics, readily spanned both realms - to help explain policy outcomes such as the creation of the US National Science Foundation. Kleinman's boundary élite perform largely the same bridging function as Moore's public-interest organizations, but in making no reference to the constructivist perspective on boundaries, Kleinman implicitly accepts that there were separate realms of science and politics that needed bridging, rather than some other arrangement. Similarly, Hoch describes the mediating rôle of these élites within the 'military-industrial-scientific alliance' with little concern for how the actors involved negotiate the boundaries within that alliance. See: D.L. Kleinman, Politics and the Endless Frontier: Postwar Research Policy in the United States (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995); P.K. Hoch, 'The Crystallization of a Strategic Alliance: The American Physics Elite and the Military in the 1940s', in Everett Mendelsohn, Merritt Roe Smith and Peter Weingart (eds), Science, Technology and the Military, Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook, No. 12 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1988), 87-116.
36. In some cases, the definitions and explanations are almost functional, elaborated around the ability of the boundary object or standardized package to perform a particular task, rather than explaining that ability.
37. Gieryn, op. cit. note 1, 435-39.
38. Star & Griesemer, op. cit. note 9, 413.
39. Moore, op. cit. note 13, 1621.
40. This section is derived largely from Guston, op. cit. note 3.
41. Stephen P. Turner, 'Forms of Patronage', in Susan E. Cozzens and Thomas F. Gieryn (eds), Theories of Science in Society (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), 185-211, at 186.
42. Oliver E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications: A Study in the Economics of Internal Organization (New York: Free Press, 1975). I am not using transaction costs themselves as an explanatory variable, however.
43. 'Contracting' has metaphorical significance in science policy, as analysts and policymakers often speak of a 'social contract for science' as the promise by science 'to deliver goods to society in return for its patronage with no strings attached': Arie Rip, 'An Exercise in Forethought: The Research System in Transition - To What?', in Susan E. Cozzens, Peter Healey, Rip and John Ziman (eds), The Research System in Transition, NATO ASA Series D, Vol. 57 (Boston, MA & Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990), 387-401, at 399. For more on the social contract for science, see, inter alia: Radford R. Byerly, Jr and Roger A. Pielke, Jr, 'The Changing Ecology of United States Science', Science, Vol. 269 (15 September 1995), 1531-32; David H. Guston and Kenneth Keniston, 'Updating the Social Contract for Science', Technology Review (November/December 1994), 60-68; and Harvey Brooks, 'Research Universities and the Social Contract for Science', in Lewis M. Branscomb (ed.), Empowering Technology: Implementing a US Strategy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), 202-34. The contractual perspective also has a great deal of procedural significance because of the centrality of contracts and grants between patrons (principals) and performers (agents).
44. 'Contracting' has metaphorical significance in science policy, as analysts and policymakers often speak of a 'social contract for science' as the promise by science 'to deliver goods to society in return for its patronage with no strings attached': Arie Rip, 'An Exercise in Forethought: The Research System in Transition - To What?', in Susan E. Cozzens, Peter Healey, Rip and John Ziman (eds), The Research System in Transition, NATO ASA Series D, Vol. 57 (Boston, MA & Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990), 387-401, at 399. For more on the social contract for science, see, inter alia: Radford R. Byerly, Jr and Roger A. Pielke, Jr, 'The Changing Ecology of United States Science', Science, Vol. 269 (15 September 1995), 1531-32; David H. Guston and Kenneth Keniston, 'Updating the Social Contract for Science', Technology Review (November/December 1994), 60-68; and Harvey Brooks, 'Research Universities and the Social Contract for Science', in Lewis M. Branscomb (ed.), Empowering Technology: Implementing a US Strategy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), 202-34. The contractual perspective also has a great deal of procedural significance because of the centrality of contracts and grants between patrons (principals) and performers (agents).
45. 'Contracting' has metaphorical significance in science policy, as analysts and policymakers often speak of a 'social contract for science' as the promise by science 'to deliver goods to society in return for its patronage with no strings attached': Arie Rip, 'An Exercise in Forethought: The Research System in Transition - To What?', in Susan E. Cozzens, Peter Healey, Rip and John Ziman (eds), The Research System in Transition, NATO ASA Series D, Vol. 57 (Boston, MA & Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990), 387-401, at 399. For more on the social contract for science, see, inter alia: Radford R. Byerly, Jr and Roger A. Pielke, Jr, 'The Changing Ecology of United States Science', Science, Vol. 269 (15 September 1995), 1531-32; David H. Guston and Kenneth Keniston, 'Updating the Social Contract for Science', Technology Review (November/December 1994), 60-68; and Harvey Brooks, 'Research Universities and the Social Contract for Science', in Lewis M. Branscomb (ed.), Empowering Technology: Implementing a US Strategy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), 202-34. The contractual perspective also has a great deal of procedural significance because of the centrality of contracts and grants between patrons (principals) and performers (agents).
46. 'Contracting' has metaphorical significance in science policy, as analysts and policymakers often speak of a 'social contract for science' as the promise by science 'to deliver goods to society in return for its patronage with no strings attached': Arie Rip, 'An Exercise in Forethought: The Research System in Transition - To What?', in Susan E. Cozzens, Peter Healey, Rip and John Ziman (eds), The Research System in Transition, NATO ASA Series D, Vol. 57 (Boston, MA & Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1990), 387-401, at 399. For more on the social contract for science, see, inter alia: Radford R. Byerly, Jr and Roger A. Pielke, Jr, 'The Changing Ecology of United States Science', Science, Vol. 269 (15 September 1995), 1531-32; David H. Guston and Kenneth Keniston, 'Updating the Social Contract for Science', Technology Review (November/December 1994), 60-68; and Harvey Brooks, 'Research Universities and the Social Contract for Science', in Lewis M. Branscomb (ed.), Empowering Technology: Implementing a US Strategy (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1993), 202-34. The contractual perspective also has a great deal of procedural significance because of the centrality of contracts and grants between patrons (principals) and performers (agents).
47. These problems are also known as 'hidden information' and 'hidden action', respectively: see Arrow, op. cit. note 3, 38-40.
48. For more on monitoring and incentives in a political context, see William A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago, IL: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), esp. Chapter 18.
49. For example, the choice of research performers - whether at the level of the individual researcher, or at higher levels of aggregation such as the choice between military and civilian research, intramural or extramural, mission-oriented versus disciplinary, or large versus small firms - has elements of the adverse selection problem. The political principal faces a bewildering array of potential agents, but has little certainty about which agents will best pursue the established goals. For the choice of individual researchers, political principals in the USA have often solved the problem of adverse selection by delegating authority to scientific peers. Choices at higher levels of aggregation have been explicitly political ones, informed by competition among performers and third-party monitors and advocates, which all serve to reduce the maldistribution of knowledge. The problem of adverse selection may also be why the vast majority of basic research in the USA is conducted through mission agencies.
50. In the United Kingdom, the Committee on Publication Ethics, an alliance of journal editors, has called for the establishment of an organization similar to ORI, and the General Medical Council has echoed it: see Nigel Williams, 'Editors Call for Misconduct Watchdog', Science, Vol. 280 (12 June 1998), 1685-86.
51. Much of the following two sections is derived from David H. Guston, The Social Contract for Science: Congress, the National Institutes of Health, and the Boundary Between Politics and Science (Cambridge, MA: unpublished PhD thesis, Department of Political Science, MIT, 1993).
52. Vannevar Bush, Science, The Endless Frontier (Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1960 [1945]).
53. See, for example, Talcott Parsons' critique of the legislation derived from Bush's report: T. Parsons, 'National Science Legislation: Part I: An Historical Review', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 2, Nos 9 & 10 (1 November 1946), 7-9.
54. For more on the issue of intellectual property during the immediate post-war era, see David M. Hart, Forging the 'Post-War Consensus': Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in the United States, 1921-1953 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), as well as J. Merton England, A Patron for Pure Science (Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1982) and Kleinman, op. cit. note 14.
55. For more on the issue of intellectual property during the immediate post-war era, see David M. Hart, Forging the 'Post-War Consensus': Science, Technology, and Economic Policy in the United States, 1921-1953 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), as well as J. Merton England, A Patron for Pure Science (Washington, DC: National Science Foundation, 1982) and Kleinman, op. cit. note 14.
56. John A. Alic, Lewis M. Branscomb, Harvey Brooks, Ashton B. Carter and Gerald L. Epstein, Beyond Spinoff: Military and Commercial Technologies in a Changing World (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 10, 25.
57. George Wise, 'Science and Technology', in Sally G. Kohlstedt and Margaret W. Rossiter (eds), Historical Perspectives on American Science: Perspectives and Prospects (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 229-46.
58. Alic et al., op. cit. note 31, 10.
59. Although there were some heated discussions about the propriety of encouraging private profit from federally sponsored research, the passage of the technology-transfer legislation was uniformly and overwhelmingly bipartisan.
60. van der Meulen (op. cit. note 3) uses an iterated principal-agent game to describe how the relationship between the state and the scientific community is path-dependent, following a regular route from a situation in which each party trusts each other to a situation in which more formal, institutionalized relations are necessary. I argue here that principal-agent theory also helps us understand how those institutional relations are structured.
61. There are more than 700 of these laboratories across most government missions and styles of research. For their role in the research system, see: L.M. Branscomb, 'National Laboratories: The Search for New Missions and New Structures', in Branscomb (ed.), op. cit. note 22, 103-34; Barry Bozeman and Michael M. Crow, Limited By Design: Federal Laboratories and the US National Innovation System (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
62. There are more than 700 of these laboratories across most government missions and styles of research. For their role in the research system, see: L.M. Branscomb, 'National Laboratories: The Search for New Missions and New Structures', in Branscomb (ed.), op. cit. note 22, 103-34; Barry Bozeman and Michael M. Crow, Limited By Design: Federal Laboratories and the US National Innovation System (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
63. See Niskanen, op. cit. note 24, Chapter 18.
64. The intramural laboratories are government labs, as defined above.
65. For a history of the early years of NIH, see Victoria A. Harden, Inventing the NIH: Federal Biomedical Research Policy, 1887-1937 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); for postwar developments, see Stephen P. Strickland, Politics, Science and Dread Disease: A Short History of United States Medical Research Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), and Strickland, The Story of the NIH Grants Program (New York: New York University Press, 1989).
66. For a history of the early years of NIH, see Victoria A. Harden, Inventing the NIH: Federal Biomedical Research Policy, 1887-1937 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); for postwar developments, see Stephen P. Strickland, Politics, Science and Dread Disease: A Short History of United States Medical Research Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), and Strickland, The Story of the NIH Grants Program (New York: New York University Press, 1989).
67. For a history of the early years of NIH, see Victoria A. Harden, Inventing the NIH: Federal Biomedical Research Policy, 1887-1937 (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); for postwar developments, see Stephen P. Strickland, Politics, Science and Dread Disease: A Short History of United States Medical Research Policy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), and Strickland, The Story of the NIH Grants Program (New York: New York University Press, 1989).
68. Intersociety Working Group, Congressional Action on Research & Development in the FY 1997 Budget (Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1996).
69. One could imagine broadening the empirical inquiry both by issue (e.g. examine scientific integrity in addition to technology transfer) and by institution (e.g. Department of Energy, or universities, in addition to NIH). I am in the midst of the former.
70. All quotations in this section are from semi-structured interviews conducted by the author in the Fall and Winter of 1991-92, and in January 1993. All interviews were conducted in the subjects' places of business (in Washington, DC and in Bethesda, MD), and were tape-recorded and transcribed by the author. Subjects were chosen for their knowledge of, and rôle in, the policy issues discussed. See Guston, op. cit. note 27, esp. Chapter 2 (for the interview methodology) & Chapter 6 (for further details on specific interviews).
71. D.S. Fredrickson, 'On the Translation Gap' (Bethesda, MD: National Institutes of Health, mimeo, 1975), 2.
72. Ibid., 6.
73. Office of Technology Assessment, Technology Transfer at the National Institutes of Health (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, OTA-TM-H-10, 1982). OMAR's web page has information about all the consensus-development conferences it conducts: .
74. Gerald E. Markle and Daryl E. Chubin, 'Consensus Development in Biomedicine: The Liver Transplant Controversy', The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 65 (1987), 1-24, at 20.
75. Institute of Medicine, Council on Health Care Technology, Consensus Development at NIH: Improving the Program (Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1990), 10.
76. Office of Medical Applications of Research, 'Guidelines for the Planning and Management of Consensus Development Conferences': (updated March 1995, accessed 12 August 1997).
77. Terry M. Moe, 'An Assessment of the Positive Theory of "Congressional Dominance" ', Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4 (November 1987), 475-520, at 481.
78. General Accounting Office (GAO), Technology Transfer: Implementation Status of the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (Washington, DC: GAO, RCED-89-154, 1989).
79. For a discussion of unexpected ('serendipitous') discoveries, and the problems involved in recognizing and assimilating them, see David O. Edge and Michael J. Mulkay, Astronomy Transformed: The Emergence of Radio Astronomy in Britain (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1976), esp. 203-08, 224-30, 386-94.
80. From data provided by OTT.
81. PMA is the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, a trade group.
82. General Accounting Office, Technology Transfer: Barriers Limit Royalty Sharing's Effectiveness (Washington, DC: GAO, RCED-93-6, 1992), 43. FTTA originally mandated a minimum of 15% of the royalty income, with a $100,000 annual cap. NTTA established a $2000 baseline and then added the 15%.
83. GAO, op. cit. note 54.
84. D.H. Guston, 'Technology Transfer and the Use of CRADAs at the National Institutes of Health', in L.M. Branscomb and James Keller (eds), Investing in Innovation (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 221-49.
85. Gieryn (op. cit. note 1, 409-11) describes the work of Andrew Abbott, who offers a typology for describing how separate professions settle conflict over jurisdiction. The division of labour, in this scheme, means the splitting of tasks between two interdependent professions with roughly equal status and resources. This situation is close to that of 'intellectual control' in which the production of abstract knowledge is controlled separately from its applications. Because the technology-transfer specialists collaborate with the researchers in identifying discoveries, making research plans and other tasks to engage in cooperative research and development, and researchers collaborate in licensing and marketing, the jurisdictional settlement is not as neat as 'intellectual control' would suggest, and therefore division of labour is appropriate. See Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1988).
86. This perspective on science policy borrows from Bruno Latour's vision of science itself. Latour's Janus-faced science is able to project authority by appealing to either face in a strategic fashion: the boundary organization is able to project authority by showing its responsive face to either audience. See B. Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987), esp. 141-43.
87. Guston, op. cit. note 56.
88. Barry Bozeman draws on Howard Aldrich's concept of the 'boundary-spanning' activities of organizations to help explain how organizations insulate themselves from external political authority. Organizations engage in boundary-spanning activities to exploit opportunities in, or respond to threats from, their environment. The boundary organization draws its stability not from isolating itself from external political authority, but precisely by making itself accountable and responsive to opposing external authorities. The boundaries that were important to Aldrich were only those of the organization itself (which determined its membership), rather than the boundaries of any domains in the organization's environment. See B. Bozeman, All Organizations are Public (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1987); and H.E. Aldrich, Organizations and Environments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979).
89. Barry Bozeman draws on Howard Aldrich's concept of the 'boundary-spanning' activities of organizations to help explain how organizations insulate themselves from external political authority. Organizations engage in boundary-spanning activities to exploit opportunities in, or respond to threats from, their environment. The boundary organization draws its stability not from isolating itself from external political authority, but precisely by making itself accountable and responsive to opposing external authorities. The boundaries that were important to Aldrich were only those of the organization itself (which determined its membership), rather than the boundaries of any domains in the organization's environment. See B. Bozeman, All Organizations are Public (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1987); and H.E. Aldrich, Organizations and Environments (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1979).
90. Sheila Jasanoff, 'Beyond Epistemology: Relativism and Engagement in the Politics of Science', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 26, No. 2 (May 1996), 393-418, at 397.
91. Bruce Bimber's discussion of the US Office of Technology Assessment presents a similar argument about OTA's responsiveness to a bipartisan environment: see B. Bimber, The Politics of Expertise in Congress: The Rise and Fall of the Office of Technology Assessment (Albany, NY: The State University of New York Press, 1996).