A reexamination of agency theory assumptions: Extensions and extrapolations

Journal of Socio-Economics

Volumn 30, Issue 5, 2001, Pages 413-429

  Wright, Peter ^a   Mukherji, Ananda ^b   Kroll, Mark J ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS   (United States)

^b TEXAS A AND M INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c LOUISIANA TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041319498     PISSN: 10535357     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S1053-5357(01)00102-0     Document Type: Article

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