Delegation and accountability in parliamentary democracies

European Journal of Political Research

Volumn 37, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 261-289

  Strøm, Kaare ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034179207     PISSN: 03044130     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1475-6765.00513     Document Type: Article

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