Firm performance and executive compensation in the savings and loan industry

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 61, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 139-170

  Hermalin, Benjamin E ^a   Wallace, Nancy E ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

C33; G21; G39; Heterogeneity; J33; Pay for performance; Savings loans

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035402416     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00058-7     Document Type: Article

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