The power of paradox: Some recent developments in interactive epistemology

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 465-492

  Brandenburger, Adam ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947494777     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0061-2     Document Type: Article

References (79)

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