Sequential and quasi-perfect rationalizability in extensive games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 53, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 15-42

  Asheim, Geir B ^a   Perea, Andrés ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OSLO   (Norway)

^b MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Extensive games; Rationalizability

Indexed keywords

EID: 26844490137     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.015     Document Type: Article

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