Order independence for iterated weak dominance

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 219-245

  Marx, Leslie M ^a   Swinkels, Jeroen M ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ROCHESTER   (United States)

^b NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031067839     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0525     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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