On the impact of an event

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 315-330

  Sorin, Sylvain ^a,b  

^a ECOLE POLYTECHNIQUE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ PARIS OUEST NANTERRE LA DÉFENSE   (France)

Author keywords

Information structure; Transmission of knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032221798     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050075     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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