On the equivalence of weak dominance and sequential best response

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 48, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 385-402

  Shimoji, Makoto ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^b YOKOHAMA NATIONAL UNIVERSITY   (Japan)

Author keywords

Conditional dominance; Forward induction; Normal form information set; Rationalizability; Sequential best response; Weak dominance

Indexed keywords

EID: 3242809850     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2003.09.003     Document Type: Article

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