Knowledge, belief and counterfactual reasoning in games

Economics and Philosophy

Volumn 12, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 133-163

  Stalnaker, Robert ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84945190264     PISSN: 02662671     EISSN: 14740028     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0266267100004132     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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