A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction

Journal of Mathematical Economics

Volumn 27, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 325-345

  Balkenborg, Dieter ^a,b   Winter, Eyal ^c,d  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

^c HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^d WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Backward induction; Common knowledge; Extensive games; Subgame perfection

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031115828     PISSN: 03044068     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-4068(96)00776-8     Document Type: Article

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