The hierarchical approach to modeling knowledge and common knowledge

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 331-365

  Fagin, Ronald ^a   Geanakoplos, John ^b   Halpern, Joseph Y ^c   Vardi, Moshe Y ^d  

^a IBM ALMADEN RESEARCH CENTER   (United States)

^b YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

^d Rice University   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033469818     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050114     Document Type: Article

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