Conditional Dominance, Rationalizability, and Game Forms

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 83, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 161-195

  Shimoji, Makoto ^a   Watson, Joel ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000326327     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2460     Document Type: Article

References (28)

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