Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 263-300

  Aumann, Robert J ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

Common knowledge; Epistemology; Interactive epistemology; Knowledge; Model; Semantic; Syntactic

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033431139     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820050111     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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