Subjective reasoning - Dynamic games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 54-93

  Feinberg, Yossi ^a  

^a STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Epistemology; Rationality; Reasoning

Indexed keywords

EID: 20344371196     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2004.06.001     Document Type: Article

References (39)

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