The political economy of antidumping: A survey

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 554-590

  Nelson, Douglas ^a,b  

^a TULANE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Antidumping; Political economy

Indexed keywords

EID: 33746816612     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2005.12.002     Document Type: Article

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