Endogenous protection, foreign direct investment and protection-building trade

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 205-227

  Blonigen, Bruce A ^a   Ohno, Yuka ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OREGON   (United States)

^b RICE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Endogenous protection; Foreign direct investment; Strategic trade policy

Indexed keywords

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT; INTERNATIONAL TRADE; PROTECTIONISM; TRADE POLICY;

UNITED STATES;

EID: 0032455330     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(97)00042-1     Document Type: Article

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