The magic bullet? The RTAA, institutional reform, and trade liberalization

International Organization

Volumn 53, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 669-698

  Hiscox, Michael J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033468798     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002081899551039     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. Aldrich, John. 1995. Why Parties? The Origins and Transformation of Political Parties in America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
2. Alesina, Alberto. 1989. Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies. Economic Policy 8:57-87.
3. Alesina, Alberto, and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Bailey, Michael A., Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast. 1997. The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy. World Politics 49 (3):309-38.
5. Baldwin, Robert E., 1985. The Political Economy of U.S. Import Policy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
6. _. 1993. Changes in the Global Trading System: A Response to Shifts in National Economic Power. In Protectionism and World Welfare, edited by Dominick Salvatore, 80-98. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7. Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1988. Protectionism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
8. Burnham, Walter Dean. 1965. The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe. American Political Science Review 59 (1):7-28.
9. _. 1970. Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics. New York: Norton.
10. Cox, Gary W., and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1993. Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House. Berkeley: University of California Press.
11. Crotty, William, and Gary C. Jacobson. 1980. American Parties in Decline. Boston: Little, Brown.
12. Destler, I. M. 1992. American Trade Politics. 2d ed. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.
13. Diebold, William, Jr. 1941. New Directions in Our Trade Policy. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
14. Dollar, Charles M., and Richard J. Jensen. 1971. Historian's Guide to Statistics: Quantitative Analysis and Historical Research. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
15. Gilligan, Michael. 1997. Empowering Exporters: Reciprocity, Delegation, and Collective Action in American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
16. Goldstein, Judith. 1988. Ideas, Institutions, and Trade Policy. International Organization 42 (1):179-217.
17. _. 1993. Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy. Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press.
18. Haggard, Stephan. 1988. The Institutional Foundations of Hegemony: Explaining the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1834. International Organization 42 (1):91-118.
19. Hathaway, Oona A. 1998. Positive Feedback: The Impact of Trade Liberalization on Industry Demands for Protection. International Organization 52 (3):575-612.
20. Hibbs, Douglas. 1977. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review 71 (4):1467-87.
21. Hiscox, Michael J. 1997. The Trade War at Home: Factor Mobility, International Trade, and Political Coalitions in Democracies. Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
22. Hull, Cordell. 1948. Memoirs of Cordell Hull. New York: Macmillan.
23. Irwin, Douglas A. 1993. Free Trade and Protection in Nineteenth-Century Britain and France Revisited: A Comment on Nye. Journal of Economic History 53 (1):146-52.
24. _. 1996. Changes in U.S. Tariffs: Prices or Policies? NBER Working Paper 5665. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research.
25. Jones, Ronald W. 1971. A Three-Factor Model in Theory, Trade, and History. In Trade, Balance of Payments, and Growth: Papers in International Economics in Honor of Charles P. Kindleberger, edited by Ronald W. Jones, Robert A. Mundell, and Jagdish Bhagwati, 3-21. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
26. Kim, Sukkoo. 1993. Expansion of Markets and the Geographical Distribution of Economic Activities: The Trends in U.S. Regional Manufacturing Structure, 1860-1987. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Los Angeles.
27. Krugman, Paul. 1991. Geography and Trade. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
28. Lange, Peter, and Geoffrey Garrett. 1985. The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies, 1974-1980. Journal of Politics 47 (3):792-827.
29. Lake, David A. 1988. Power, Protection, and Free Trade: International Sources of U.S. Commercial Strategy, 1887-1938. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
30. Lohmann, Susanne, and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1994. Divided Government and U.S. Trade Policy: Theory and Evidence. International Organization 48 (4):595-632.
31. Lowi, Theodore J. 1979. The End of Liberalism: The Second Republic of the United States. 2d ed. New York: Norton.
32. Mussa, Michael. 1974. Tariffs and the Distribution of Income. Journal of Political Economy 82 (6):1191-1203.
33. _. 1982. Imperfect Factor Mobility and the Distribution of Income. Journal of International Economics 12:125-41.
34. O'Halloran, Sharyn. 1994. Politics, Process, and American Trade Policy. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.
35. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 1985. Costs and Benefits of Protection. Paris: OECD.
36. Pastor, Robert A. 1980. Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929-1976. Berkeley: University of California Press.
37. Polsby, Nelson W. 1968. The Institutionalization of the United States House of Representatives. American Political Science Review 62 (1):144-68.
38. Rice, Stuart A. [1928] 1969. Quantitative Methods in Politics. Reprint, New York: Russell and Russell.
39. Riker, William H. 1980. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. American Political Science Review 74 (2):432-46.
40. Rohde, David. 1990. The Reports of My Death Are Greatly Exaggerated: Parties and Party Voting in the House of Representatives. In Changing Perspectives on Congress, edited by Glenn R. Parker. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
41. Sayre, Francis B. 1957. Glad Adventure. New York: Macmillan.
42. Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1985. The New American Political Party. American Political Science Review 79: 1152-69.
43. Schnietz, Karen E. 1994. To Delegate or Not to Delegate: Congressional Institutional Choice in the Regulation of Foreign Trade, 1916-1934. Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley.
44. Studenski, Paul, and Herman E. Krooss. 1963. Financial History of the United States. 2d ed. New York: McGraw-Hill.
45. Sundquist, James L. 1983. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States. Rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
46. Tasca, Henry J. 1938. The Reciprocal Trade Policy of the United States: A Study in Trade Philosophy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
47. Taussig, Frank W. 1931. The Tariff History of the United States. 8th ed. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons.
48. Watson, Richard A. 1956. The Tariff Revolution: A Study of Shifting Party Attitudes. Journal of Politics 18 (4):678-701.
49. Wattenberg, Martin P. 1984. The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952-80. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
50. Weingast, Barry R. 1979. A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms. American Journal of Political Science 23 (2):245-62.
51. Weingast, Barry R., Kenneth A. Shepsle, and Christopher Johnsen. 1981. The Political Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics. Journal of Political Economy 89 (4):642-64.