Self-enforcing contracts in agriculture

European Review of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 33, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 73-92

  Kvaløy, Ola ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

Author keywords

Hold up; Moral hazard; Relational contracts; Risk aversion

Indexed keywords

EID: 33745633315     PISSN: 01651587     EISSN: 14643618     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/erae/jbi037     Document Type: Article

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