Optimal linear contracts with heterogeneous agents

European Review of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 29, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 205-217

  Levy, Armando ^a   Vukina, Tomislav ^b  

^a ANALYSIS GROUP   (United States)

^b NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Heterogeneous abilities; Moral hazard; Transaction costs

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036303754     PISSN: 01651587     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/eurrag/29.2.205     Document Type: Article

References (13)

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