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Volumn 15, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 704-736

The role of risk in contract choice

(2)  Allen, Douglas W a   Lueck, Dean a  

a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords


EID: 0033477598     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/15.3.704     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (89)

References (50)
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