Grower risk aversion and the cost of moral hazard in livestock production contracts

American Journal of Agricultural Economics

Volumn 86, Issue 3, 2004, Pages 835-841

  Dubois, Pierre ^a   Vukina, Tomislav ^b  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b NORTH CAROLINA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

LIVESTOCK FARMING;

EID: 3242697733     PISSN: 00029092     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0002-9092.2004.00634.x     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. Ferrall, C., and B. Shearer. "Incentives and Transactions Costs Within the Firm: Estimating an Agency Model Using Payroll Records." Review of Economic Studies 66(1999):309-38.
2. Margiotta, M.M., and R.A. Miller. "Managerial Compensation and the Cost of Moral Hazard." International Economic Review 41(2000 ):669-720
3. Martin, L.L. "Production Contracts, Risk Shifting, and Relative Performance Payments in the Pork Industry." Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics 29(1997):267-78.
4. Paarsch, H. J., and B. Shearer. "Piece Rate, Fixed Wages, and Incentive Effects: Statistical Evidence from Payroll Records." International Economic Review 41(2000):59-92.
5. Prendergast, C. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms." Journal of Economic Literature 37(1999):7-63.