Contract choice in agriculture with joint moral hazard in effort and risk

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 63, Issue 2, 2000, Pages 303-326

  Ghatak, Maitreesh ^a   Pandey, Priyanka ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

^b PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Limited liability; Moral hazard; Risk taking; Sharecropping tenancy

Indexed keywords

CULTIVATION; FARMING SYSTEM; RISK ASSESSMENT; SHARECROPPING; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0034529778     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0304-3878(00)00116-4     Document Type: Article

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