Eviction threats and investment incentives

Journal of Development Economics

Volumn 74, Issue 2, 2004, Pages 469-488

  Banerjee, Abhijit V ^a   Ghatak, Maitreesh ^b  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Eviction threats; Investment incentives; Sharecropping tenancy

Indexed keywords

INVESTMENT INCENTIVE; LANDOWNER; SHARECROPPING; TENURE SYSTEM;

EID: 2442670747     PISSN: 03043878     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.07.004     Document Type: Article

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