Team incentives in relational employment contracts

Journal of Labor Economics

Volumn 24, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 139-169

  Kvaløy, Ola ^a   Olsen, Trond E ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

^b NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 32144459283     PISSN: 0734306X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/497821     Document Type: Review

References (39)

1. Ackerberg, Daniel M., and Maristella Botticini. 2002. Endogenous matching and the empirical determinants of contract form. Journal of Political Economy 110:564-91.
2. Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review 62: 777-95.
3. Appelbaum, Eileen, and Peter Berg. 1999. High-performance work systems: Giving workers a stake. In The new relationship: Human capital in the American corporation, ed. Margareth M. Blair and Thomas A. Kochan. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
4. Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin J. Murphy. 1994. Subjective performance measures in optimal incentive contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 109:1125-56.
5. _. 2002. Relational contracts and the theory of the firm. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:39-94.
6. Bewley, Truman. 1999. Why wages don't fall during a recession. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
7. Bull, Clive. 1987. The existence of self-enforcing implicit contracts. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102:147-59.
8. Carmichael, H. Lorne. 1981. Implicit contracting and seniority rules. PhD diss., Department of Economics, Stanford University.
9. _. 1983. The agent-agents problem: Payment by relative output. Journal of Labor Economics 1:50-65.
10. Che, Yeon-Koo, and Seung-Weon Yoo. 2001. Optimal incentives for teams. American Economic Review 91:525-40.
11. Chiappori, Pierre-André, and Bernard Salanié. 2002. Testing contract theory: A survey of some recent work. In Advances in economics and econometrics, vol. 1, ed. Mathias Dewatripont, Lars Peter Hansen, and Stephen J. Turnovsky. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12. FitzRoy, Felix R., and Kornelius Kraft. 1995. On the choice of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 26:145-60.
13. Green, Jerry R., and Nancy L. Stokey. 1983. A comparison of tournaments and contracts. Journal of Political Economy 91:349-64.
14. Hart, Oliver. 2001. Norms and the theory of the firm. University of Pennsylvania Law Review 149:1701-15.
15. Holmström, Bengt. 1979. Moral hazard and observability. Bell Journal of Economics 10:74-91.
16. _. 1982. Moral hazard in teams. Bell Journal of Economics 13:324-40.
17. Holmström, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. 1990. Regulating trade among agents. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146:85-105.
18. Itoh, Hideshi. 1993. Coalition incentives and risk sharing. Journal of Economic Theory 60:410-27.
19. James Jr., Harvey S. 2002. The trust paradox: A survey of economic inquiries into the nature of trust and trustworthiness. Journal of Economic Behaviour and Organization 47:291-307.
20. Kandel, Eugene, and Edward P. Lazear. 1992. Peer pressure and partnerships. Journal of Political Economy 100:801-17.
21. Klein, Benjamin, and Keith Leffler. 1981. The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance. Journal of Political Economy 89: 615-41.
22. Kreps, David M. 1990. Corporate culture and economic theory. In Per spectives on positive political economy, ed. James E. Alt and Kenneth A. Shepsle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
23. Kvaløy, Ola, and Trond E. Olsen. 2005. Team incentives with agent hold-up. Unpublished manuscript, Department of Business Administration, University of Stavanger, Norway.
24. Lazear, Edward P. 1989. Pay equality and industrial politics. Journal of Political Economy 97:561-80.
25. _. 1998. Personnel economics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
26. Lazear, Edward P., and Sherwin Rosen. 1981. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political Economy 89:841-64.
27. Levin, Jonathan. 2002. Multilateral contracting and the employment relationship. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117:1075-1103.
28. _. 2003. Relational incentive contracts. American Economic Review 93:835-57.
29. Macho-Stadler, Ines, and J. David Perez-Catrillo. 1993. Moral hazard with several agents: The gains from cooperation. International Journal of Industrial Organization 11:73-100.
30. MacLeod, Bentley, and James Malcomson. 1989. Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment. Econometrica 57:447-80.
31. Macneil, Ian. 1978. Contracts: Adjustments of long-term economic relations under classical, neoclassical, and relational contract law. North-western University Law Review 252:854-906.
32. Malcomson, James M. 1984. Work incentives, hierarchy and internal labor markets. Journal of Political Economy 92:486-507.
33. Mookherjee, Dilip. 1984. Optimal incentive schemes with many agents. Review of Economic Studies 51:433-46.
34. Nalebuff, Barry J., and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1983. Prizes and incentives: Toward a general theory of compensation and competition. Bell Journal of Economics 14:21-43.
35. Prendergast, Canice. 1999. The provisions of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Literature 37:7-63.
36. Radner, Roy. 1986. Repeated partnership games with imperfect monitoring and no discounting. Review of Economic Studies 43:43-51.
37. Schmidt, Klaus M., and Monika Schnitzer. 1995. The interaction of explicit and implicit contracts. Economics Letters 48:193-99.
38. Shapiro, Carl, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1984. Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device. American Economic Review 74:433-44.
39. Weitzman, Martin L., and Douglas Kruse. 1990. Profit sharing and productivity. In Paying for productivity: A look at the evidence, ed. Alan S. Blinder. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.