Coordination mechanisms

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 3142, Issue , 2004, Pages 345-357

  Christodoulou, George ^a   Koutsoupias, Elias ^a   Nanavati, Akash ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ATHENS   (Greece)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE; COMPUTER SCIENCE; COMPUTERS;

CONGESTION GAMES; COORDINATION MECHANISMS; NASH EQUILIBRIA; PRICE OF ANARCHY; SELFISH TASK ALLOCATIONS; SOCIAL OPTIMUMS; UPPER AND LOWER BOUNDS; WORST-CASE PERFORMANCE;

TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

EID: 33744943067     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-27836-8_31     Document Type: Article

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