How much can taxes help selfish routing?

Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 98-107

  Cole, Richard ^a   Dodis, Yevgeniy ^a   Roughgarden, Tim ^b  

^a POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Cornell University ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; Nash equilibria; Network pricing; Selfish routing

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; CONGESTION CONTROL (COMMUNICATION); ECONOMICS; GAME THEORY; PROBLEM SOLVING; TAXATION; TELECOMMUNICATION TRAFFIC;

NETWORK TRAFFIC; ROUTE TRAFFIC; SELFISH ROUTING; TOTAL LATENCY;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 0242456249     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/779928.779941     Document Type: Conference Paper

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