The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology

Conference Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2002, Pages 428-437

  Roughgarden, Tim ^a  

^a Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTER NETWORKS; INFORMATION THEORY; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; ROUTERS; TELECOMMUNICATION TRAFFIC; TOPOLOGY;

NETWORK TOPOLOGY; NONCOOPERATIVE NETWORK USERS;

COMPUTATION THEORY;

EID: 0036039332     PISSN: 07349025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/509967.509971     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (22)

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7. Worst-case equilibria
8. Virtual path bandwidth allocation in multiuser networks
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10. Competitive routing in multi-user communication networks
11. Algorithms, games, and the Internet
12. Designing networks for selfish users is hard
13. Stackelberg scheduling strategies
14. Bounding the inefficiency of Nash equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
15. How bad is selfish routing?
16. Some theoretical aspects of road traffic research