Algorithms for selfish agentsm mechanism design for distributed computation

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 1563, Issue , 1999, Pages 1-15

  Nisan, Noam ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY;

ALGORITHMIC PROBLEMS; DISTRIBUTED AI; DISTRIBUTED COMPUTATIONS; MECHANISM DESIGN; THEORY OF MECHANISMS;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 84957082944     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-49116-3_1     Document Type: Conference Paper

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