Designing networks for selfish users is hard

Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science - Proceedings

Volumn , Issue , 2001, Pages 472-481

  Roughgarden, T ^a  

^a Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; APPROXIMATION THEORY; CONGESTION CONTROL (COMMUNICATION); FUNCTIONS; GAME THEORY; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; ROUTERS; SWITCHING NETWORKS; TELECOMMUNICATION TRAFFIC;

NASH EQUILIBRIUM;

COMPUTER NETWORKS;

EID: 0035176171     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/sfcs.2001.959923     Document Type: Conference Paper

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