Pricing network edges for heterogeneous selfish users

Conference Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 521-530

  Cole, Richard ^a   Dodis, Yevgeniy ^a   Roughgarden, Tim ^b  

^a POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b Department of Computer Science and School of Operations Research and Information Engineering   (United States)

Author keywords

Game theory; Nash equilibria; Network pricing; Selfish routing

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL METHODS; GAME THEORY; TELECOMMUNICATION TRAFFIC; THEOREM PROVING;

NETWORK PRICING;

COMPUTER NETWORKS;

EID: 0038446895     PISSN: 07349025     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/780542.780618     Document Type: Conference Paper

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