Algorithms for rational agents

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 1963, Issue , 2000, Pages 56-70

  Ronen, Amir ^a  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPUTATION THEORY; GAME THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN;

COMPUTATIONAL MODEL; DESIGN OF ALGORITHMS; MECHANISM DESIGN; RATIONAL AGENTS; RECENT TRENDS; SUB FIELDS;

SOFTWARE AGENTS;

EID: 84956982584     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/3-540-44411-4_5     Document Type: Conference Paper

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