Information gathering, transaction costs, and the property rights approach

American Economic Review

Volumn 96, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 422-434

  Schmitz, Patrick W ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

^b Centre for Economic Policy Research   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33645741286     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/000282806776157722     Document Type: Article

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