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Volumn 25, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 174-193

Contracts and Productive Information Gathering

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EID: 17544386283     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0651     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (134)

References (13)
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  • 2
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    • Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs
    • Barzel Y. Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs. J. Law Econ. XX:1977;291-307.
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    • Craswell, R.1
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    • Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract
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    • (1992) Amer. Econ. Rev. , vol.82 , pp. 566-578
    • Crémer, J.1    Khalil, F.2
  • 5
    • 4243500344 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered
    • Crémer J., Khalil F., Rochet J.-C. Strategic Information Gathering Before a Contract Is Offered. J. Econ. Theory. 1998.
    • (1998) J. Econ. Theory
    • Crémer, J.1    Khalil, F.2    Rochet, J.-C.3
  • 7
    • 0000325512 scopus 로고
    • Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant?
    • Khalil F., Lawarée J. Input versus Output Monitoring: Who Is the Residual Claimant? J. Econom. Theory. 6:1995;139-157.
    • (1995) J. Econom. Theory , vol.6 , pp. 139-157
    • Khalil, F.1    Lawarée, J.2
  • 8
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    • All or Nothing Information Control
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    • Lewis, T.R.1    Sappington, D.E.M.2
  • 10
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    • Information Management in Incentive Problems
    • Lewis T. R., Sappington D. E. M. Information Management in Incentive Problems. J. Political Econ. 105:1997;796-821.
    • (1997) J. Political Econ. , vol.105 , pp. 796-821
    • Lewis, T.R.1    Sappington, D.E.M.2
  • 11
    • 0000603092 scopus 로고
    • The Taxation Principle and Multitime Hamilton-Jacobi Equations
    • Rochet J.-C. The Taxation Principle and Multitime Hamilton-Jacobi Equations. J. Math. Econ. 14:1985;113-128.
    • (1985) J. Math. Econ. , vol.14 , pp. 113-128
    • Rochet, J.-C.1
  • 12
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    • Ironing, Sweeping and Multidimensional Screening
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    • Rochet, J.-C.1    Choné, P.2
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    • Information Control in the Principal-Agent Problem
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    • Sobel, J.1


* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.