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Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 103, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 444-460

On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems

(1) Schmitz, Patrick W a

a UNIVERSITY OF BONN (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036240350 PISSN: 00220531 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2790 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (28)

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