Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 153-173

  Rosenkranz, Stephanie ^a   Schmitz, Patrick W ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Incomplete contracts; Partnerships; Property rights; R D alliancees

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037950153     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00553-5     Document Type: Article

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