On synergies and vertical integration

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 19, Issue 8, 2001, Pages 1281-1295

  Schmitz, Patrick W ^a   Siwka, Dirk ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Core competence; Incomplete contracts; Relationship specificity; Synergies; Vertical integration

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; DECISION MAKING; INVESTMENTS;

CORE COMPETENCE; INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS; RELATIONSHIP SPECIFICITY; VERTICAL INTEGRATION;

MATHEMATICAL MODELS;

EID: 0035616710     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-7187(99)00063-6     Document Type: Article

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