Reflections on the current fashion for central bank independence

Cambridge Journal of Economics

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 549-576

  Bibow, Jörg ^a,b  

^a International Relations and Political Science   (Switzerland)

^b BARD COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Central bank independence; Credibility; Monetary policy; Rules vs discretion; Time inconsistency

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; FINANCIAL MARKET; INFLATION; MONETARY POLICY; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 3242814446     PISSN: 0309166X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/cje/28.4.549     Document Type: Article

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