Central bank independence and disinflationary credibility: A missing link?

Oxford Economic Papers

Volumn 50, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 335-359

  Posen, Adam ^a  

^a PETERSON INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000863562     PISSN: 00307653     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a028650     Document Type: Article

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